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?JORIGINAL

Plaintiff Simona objects to Third Party Defendants'

10

July 2014 MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Donna Simona ("Simono") seeks to recover damages from Defendants
Larry Rogers, Cheryl Barker, and Turner House ("Turner House) and Third Party
Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous, and Narcotics Anonymous
Literature ("Narcotics Anonymous") for injuries she sustained when she fell on a
darkened flight of stairs at the Turner House premises on the night of 07 January 2013.
Simono attended a Narcotics Anonymous meeting that was held on the on the
third floor of Turner House. When she left the meeting, she descended the stairs.
(Complaint, 111110, 11). There was no working light fixture on the second floor staircase.

Simona could not see the last two stairs before the mid-way landing. She took a step,
fell, and seriously injured both ankles. (Complaint, 111112, 13).
Larry Rogers owns Turner House. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, p. 17). Rogers was and
is in the process of remodeling Turner House. Some of the work had begun or had been
completed, including shops on the first floor, an apartment for Mr. Rogers' use on the
second floor, and a meeting room for Narcotics Anonymous on the third floor. (Dep. of
Larry Rogers, p. 11), (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, pp.25, 30). Cheryl Barker is Rogers' sister

and is the general manager of Turner House for her brother. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker,
p.6).

Narcotics Anonymous leases a space on the third floor of Turner House from
Rogers and Barker in order to hold meetings for its members (Dep. ofBob Foss, p. 8-9).

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO: THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS TREASURE VAllEY AREA
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS and NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS LITERATURE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT! Page 2 of 11

Simono contends that she was an invitee on the premises when she fell. Thus
Turner House and Narcotics Anonymous owed her a duty to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, which included the duty to exercise ordinary care in
inspecting the premises for the purpose of discovering and remedying hazards, such as
the inadequate lighting on the stairs. (See Complaint, 111117, 18).
Narcotics Anonymous contends that, as a matter of law, Simono was only a
licensee to whom they owed only a limited duty to warn of the hazards on the premises,
known and unknown to them, and not reasonably discovered by Simono. Turner House
agrees and contends that Simona should be considered a licensee as to both Narcotics
Anonymous and Turner House.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Narcotics Anonymous' recitation of the facts omits several details that
demonstrate that Plaintiff Simono was in fact, an invitee, rather than a licensee on the
night that she was injured at Turner House.
1.

Bob Foss discussed with Rogers the possibility of renting a room of Turner

House to hold daily Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Rogers agreed to rent a room to
Narcotics Anonymous for $120 per month. (Dep. ofBob Foss, pp.24, 25).
2.

On behalf of Turner House, Barker entered into a lease agreement with

Narcotics Anonymous. Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf of Narcotics Anonymous.
Foss facilitated and occasionally conducted the Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the
third floor of Turner House in a semi-remodeled room. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker pp. 3438).

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECflON TO: TIURD PARTY DEFENDANTS TREASURE VALLEY AREA
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS and NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS LITERATURE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT! Page 3 of 11

47

3.

Narcotics Anonymous has held daily meetings for its members on the third

floor of Turner House since March

2010.

(Dep. of Bob Foss, pp.8-11). AB part of the

lease agreement with Turner House, Narcotics Anonymous agreed to sweep and clean
up the common areas, maintain the third floor bathroom, replace non-working light
bulbs, and pay rent each month. (Dep. ofBob Foss, pp.11-13).
4.

Simono attended approximately five Narcotics Anonymous meetings per

month between February 2011 and

07

January

2013,

per court order. (Dep. of Donna

Simono, pp. 21, 23).

5.

Simono lives in Mountain Home, Idaho. (Dep. of Donna Simono, p. 7).

Turner House is the only Narcotics Anonymous meeting location in Mountain Home.
6.

At every meeting, a Narcotics Anonymous member routinely passed a

basket around to solicit monetary donations from the members in attendance. The
members understood that money collected was used to pay the

$120

monthly rent to

Turner House. There was not a time in which the donations collected were insufficient
to fully pay the rent to Turner House. (Dep. ofBob Foss, pp.21, 26, 27).
7.

On the night of

07

January

2013,

Simono attended a Narcotics

Anonymous meeting at Turner House. (Complaint, 1110).
8.

When she left, Simono descended the stairs. There was no working light

fixture on the second floor staircase. AB she reached the second floor, Simono could not
see the last two stairs before the mid-way landing. She took a step and fell. (Complaint,
111111, 12).

9.

Simono was injured as a result of the fall.

(Complaint, 11 13).

She

sustained fractures to her right ankle that required two surgeries.
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10.

The stairway where Simono fell was in a common area of Turner House.

11.

The Turner House second :floor electrical circuit was inoperable.

If

repaired, the circuit would have run power to two different light fixtures on the second
:floor, one of which was over the stairway. At the time of Simono's fall, neither fixture
worked due to the inoperable circuit. (Dep. ofLarry Rogers, pp. 15-16).
12.

Rogers stated that, "He [electrician hired by Rogers] could have repaired

that [circuit] months before, but it was just not that important." (Dep. of Larry Rogers,
p.17).

13.

Rogers and Barker knew that Turner House was being used by the public

and that members of Narcotics Anonymous attended meetings on the third floor. (Dep.
of Cheryl Barker, p,59).

14.

Barker thought the lighting on second story stairway was "adequate." She

stated, "We didn't worry about it." (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, p. 63). The statements of
Barker and Rogers confirm that providing power to the second story stairway light
fixture "was just not that important." (Dep. ofLarry Rogers, p. 17).
III. IAW &ARGUMENT

Narcotics Anonymous and Turner House contend that Simono, as a matter of
law, was only a licensee at Turner House when she was injured. In support, Narcotics
Anonymous cites Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir, Dist. No.

2,

97 Idaho 634, 636,

550 P.2d 137,139 (1976); Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959); and
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). Narcotics

Anonymous claims that in regards to licensees, the fact that the guest may be rendering
minor, incidental services to the host does not change the [licensee] relationship, nor is
the relationship changed by the fact that the guest and the host may have a mutual or
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common interest in the purpose of the visit, such as the service of a church, lodge, or
political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host, citing Wilson, 81 Idaho at
545,347 P.2d at 851.
Narcotics Anonymous' argument fails for two reasons: First, Simono's status
at Turner House is a question of fact. Holzheimer, supra at 399, 816. Narcotics
Anonymous' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDMENT contends that
"undisputed facts prove that Plaintiff Donna Simono was a licensee at the Turner
House property at the time of the subject accident.... " It then goes on to state, "Based
upon the pre-trial materials filed by the Plaintiff and Third Party Plaintiffs, the issue
of Plaintiff's legal status on the property is in contention."

The allegation that

Simono' s legal status is contested is a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary
judgment. Second, the law does not support Narcotic's Anonymous position.

Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994)
defined an invitee as:
...one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial,
monetary or other tangible benefit upon the landowner.
IDJI 3.13 refines the definition as follows:
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for
a purpose connected with business there conducted, or whose visit
may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business,
commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the [owner]
[occupant].
"Invitee" is synonymous with "business visitor."
The record demonstrates that Simono's presence on the Turner House
premises conferred an immediate economic benefit to Turner House and to
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECUON TO: THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS TREASURE VALLEY AREA
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Narcotics Anonymous because her donations helped Narcotics Anonymous pay
the rent. While the benefit may be indirect, it

not necessary that Simona's

purpose be to enter into immediate business dealings with the possessor

the

land -- in this case, Turner House. The benefit to the possessor may be indirect
and in the future. Thus, those who enter a shop with no present purpose of
buying, but merely to look at the goods displayed, are business visitors of the
shop, and one who comes to a residence merely to inquire about an automobile
advertised for sale is a business visitor of the possessor. It is not necessary that
the particular visit shall offer the possibility of business dealings or of benefit to
the possessor. It is enough that it has reasonable connection with another visit
which does. Thus one whom comes to return goods purchased and to demand
his money back is still a business visitor. Restatement (Second) of Torts,§ 332.
Even if Simono were only a gratuitous licensee of Narcotics Anonymous,
she would still be a business visitor and invitee of Turner House under § 332.
Comment k to subsection (3) of that section states:
A person may be a business visitor of a lessor of land although he is
merely a gratuitous licensee of the lessee. Thus, a lessor of an
apartment in an apartment house or of an office in an office
building, who retains the control of the halls, stairways, and other
approaches to the apartment or office, holds such parts of the
premises open to any person whom his lessee may choose to admit,
irrespective of whether the visit of such a person is for his own or
the lessee's business purpose or whether he comes as a mere social
guest or other licensee of the tenant.
Id.
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In comparison, comment g to subsection (3) states:
Visits incidental to business relations ofpossessor and third persons. It is
not necessary that the visitor shall himself be upon the land for the
purposes of the possessor's business. The visit may be for the convenience
or arise out of the necessities of others who are themselves upon the land
for such a purpose. Thus those who go to a hotel to pay social calls upon
the guests or to a railway station to meet passengers or bid them farewell,
are business visitors, since it is part of the business of the hotelkeeper and
railway to afford the guest and passengers such conveniences. So too, a
child taken by a mother or nurse to a shop is a business visitor; and this is
true irrespective of whether it is necessary for the customer to take the
child with her in order to visit the shop.
Id.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Menard v. Cashman, 94 N.H. 428, 55
A.2d 156 (1947) found that a landlord had a business interest in the public being able to
enter his building by a common stairway to visit tenants. A Delaware Court in Hok.sch v.
Startford Apartments, Inc., 283 A.2d 687,689 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), held that a
landlord had a business interest in the ingress and egress of those whom its tenant
would admit to the premises.
In this case, there is no genuine issue of fact that Turner House had a business
interest in having Narcotics anonymous receive meeting attendees. As stated in Hoksch,
supra at 689:
It is fair to conjecture that it would be difficult if not impossible for a landlord to

lease an apartment with the stipulation that the lessee was prohibited from
inviting any people whatsoever to that apartment, regardless of the purpose of
the visit. It is obvious that the ability to allow social guests, deliverymen, movers,
and other such visitors to come to a rented apartment is part of the attractiveness
of such a place. Without this benefit, the number of a landlord's prospective
tenants would be greatly diminished. Therefore, I do not believe that it strains
the imagination to find that an occupier of land maybe benefited by visits from
those whom he has not expressly invited.
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In Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding the admission of evidence
jury instructions characterizing an airplane owner as an invitee. Tomich was the
owner and pilot of a small airplane that was destroyed in a windstorm at a municipal
airport due to improper maintenance and failure of tie-downs on the runway.
The city sought a directed verdict, stating that Tomich was not an invitee. The
trial court denied the request and instead instructed the jury according to the definition
of "invitee" found in IDJI 3.13. The city focused on the word "business" and contended
that Tomich was not an invitee because he used his plane for recreational purposes. See

Tomich, at 127 Idaho at 399,901 P.2d at 506.
The Supreme Court held that because Tomich used the airport to fly his plane,
which is the "business there conducted" at an airport, he was therefore an invitee. The
fact that an individual has a personal or recreational reason for entering the premises of
another is irrelevant to whether that individual meets the definition of an invitee. The
relevant inquiry is whether the individual enters the premises for a purpose connected
with the business conducted on those premises. The Court found that Tomich used the
airport in exactly the manner for which it was intended, designed, and commonly used,
thereby benefitting the city. Therefore, Tomich was an invitee. [emphasis added]. See
Id.
Simono's purpose for attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings at Turner House
had a personal component - to receive addiction recovery support from other members
and to comply with the terms of her court order. However, she attended meetings in the
space within Turner House that was leased by Narcotics Anonymous for the "purpose
connected with Narcotics Anonymous' business conducted at Turner House." Narcotics
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO: THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS TREASURE VALLEY AREA
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I,
I
'

Anonymous and Turner House both benefitted from Simono's meeting attendance and
the donations she made, which contributed to the rent.
The authorities cited support the proposition that not only was Simono not a
licensee when she fell; she was an invitee as a matter oflaw.
IV. CONCLUSION

Simono respectfully asserts that her legal status on the Turner House premises
on 07 January 2013 was that of an invitee. As such, Narcotics Anonymous' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT should be denied.
DATED 02, August 2014.
LAW-IDAHO PLLC
By:

Sheli Fulcher Koontz,
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF TH.B FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAH01 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EtMORE
DONNA SIMONO.

Case No.cv..2013-209

TTJRNER HOUSE+ l.ARR.V J. ROOE.RS.

REPLY TO PLAIN'rlFF'S

CHERYL BARKER. AND DOES I throuQh X.

OB.JECTION 'fO 'l'HlRD PARTY
DEFENDAN~r,s M()1'lON FO.R
:PARTIAL SUMMARY
~JUDGMENT AND MOTION 1'0
STRIKE THE PLAIN'fIF''F'S

OBJECTION
Defendant$.
TURNER HOUSEt l,ARRY J. ROCiER.S,
CHERYL BARKER.
Third Party Plaintif'Th,

TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF NARCOTICS
ANONYMOUS, and NARCOTICS
ANONYMOUS LlTERATUREt
Third Pan:y Defendants.

REPLY TO 11 IiAl'NT1FF'S OBJECTION TO THIRD PAR.TY DEFENDANT'S MO'rION
f.'OR PAR'rJAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT~ 1

I. M01~I0N TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION

Third Party Detendants (Natcoth:.s Anonymous) filed their motion for partial summary
judsment on July 9, 2014. Narcot.i.cs Anonymous then med a notice of hearing on July 10, 2014~
noticl.ng this hearing fbr August l 8. 2014. Plainti ff fl led her object.ion and suppot'ting dc)()Unlents Otl
August s. 2014.

Pursuant to IRC.P S6(c), an adverse party ls required to file a responsive brief and afiidavits no
later than J4 days before the hearing. U11der IRCP S6(c), the ~ourt may niter the time :periods ~·for

Pbdntii.f filed her objection and affidavit late breaching the strictures of fRCP 56(<:). The

Plaintiff did not mt.we tbr a change in the rC\Jui.red time periods and has not provided a "good causeri
fbr the late fillng, Narcotics Anonymous. therefore, requests that this Cout't strike Plaintiff's

Ob.)ec:Oon tt>! Third Party Defendants Treasure VaUey Area Narcotics Anonymous&. Narcotiea
Anonymous Llteratwe+ s Motlon for Partial Summ,ary Judgment (Objection) and supporting atlldavit.
II. REPLY TO PLAIN'rlFF•s ()BJECTION

In the event, this Court allows Plaintiff to nutintaln her t.1bjt,ction~ N~ln.'Otics Anonymous
replies to that objection. as follows:

A. All Relevant Factl aI"e Undb1puted
The relev.mt facts we.re set forth in Nmcotics Aoonymous•s initial briefing. Neither Plaintiff
nor Third 'Party Plaindff' s (Turner House) disagreed with the tacts irtS set furth therein. PJnirrdff did

recite some additional ftcts in ber ob.}ection. For purposes of the motion .fhr pmttal .su.n1mm1
Judgment* Narcotics An.<)nyinous will not dispute the facts recited by Plaintiff. The fBCts related by

Plalntiff if tilken as being true ahm prove u a matter of law that Ptaintif'f\vu ts H~ensee as to Narcotics
RltPLV TO PLAlN~rutF'S OBJECTION 'r() TliJR.D l'.ARTV DEFENIJANT~s MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT .. 2

I"

Anonym.ous on the 1,ight she aUegedly tell.

B. LepJ. Analyses
'The law and facts show that J>lnintiff was a liceniee. Narcotics Anonymous is not a
bu1i1iness. Narcotics Ancmymous does. not sell anything or provide any commercial aervke,

Narcotics Anon)mout is ii gathering of persons who wish t:o overcome iu:!dictlve behaviors.

Plruntiff attempts to ct'eate a connnerolal a.,pect ofNa.rcotics Anonymous due to the fact that
Narcotics Anonymous gives its mctnhers the opportunity to donate to Narcotics Anonymous, The
sole fact that Narcotics Anonymous allows its members to donate money to the organi1.at:ion does not
m:akc it a busines$. This would go dlrecdy contrary to holding of the Idaho Supreme Court sta.ting
i:hat, "The fact that the guest may be rendering minor. incidental service to the host does not change
the relationship. [Citatioru. omitted.) Nor is the relationship ohanged by the fact that the guest and the

ht1st may have a mutual or comm,)11 lntemt in the purpose of the visit suoh as the service of a church,
lodge. or political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host. [Citations omitted.)'' Wll~·on v.

Bogert, 81 Idah.o .S3S, 545,347 :P,2d .341~ 351 (l9S9). The exijn,ples named by the Idaho Supreme
Court of non ..business relath:mships arc instructive in this case.
The Court sin.gled out churohtai lodges or politico.I gatherings, lfthe Phdndffwas correct

d1at request for d()natkms i-endtared an entity a business, then every ..~htir<:h, lodge or political
organization would be co1iside1'ed a business entity. AU persona attending a church, lodge or

i,t,Utical ga.thering would be considered bush1ees visitors. Plaintiff is essentially argu.ing to change
the definition of an invitee to being any pemon who bestows any mm,eta.ey benet1t ·t(p(ltt tho person
whti they are visiting. Plaintifrs arguments1 therefore, would lead this Court tc) rule contrary to
estabUshed precedent.
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Plaint!tf c,ites T(1mtch ,,. CUyqf Poculello, 127 Idaho 394,901 P.2d sot (t995) hu,•upport of
her position that she was an invitee. A review of the holding set fo11h in Tomh.,h sho\W that it
suppo.iu Narnotfo.s Anonymous' a poi&:ition that Plaintiff was a Ucensee. 1'he Court stated:

The trlat court oorreetly in$tructed the jury th.at Tomfoh was M. invitee. Tomioh used
the airport to fly his plane, which is the 0 bmin4,.k$S there ccmducted\" at an airport. and there.fore
Tomich was 111 invitee. 1'he fact th.at atl individual has a. perscmat or reci•earlona1 reason for
c..~tering the premises of another .Is irrelevant to whether that h'tdividuw meets the definition ,1f .
an invl•. Tlie relevant lnqai,y II whether the lndl1;ldu«l ewtm the premls,sfo, a
p11,p,n1 conn'1.cted with the IHui11a1 c,'>nduct1d on thon premhei, Tomich used the
airport in exactly the manner for which it w~s intended, designed and commonly i,sed,
thereby benefldnri the eity. Therethr; Ton\ich was an invitee,
Tamtclt, 12:7 fdtiho at 399, 901 P.2d at 506. The key word in this holding ls "builness'*. N~otics

Ancm:ymous is not a "business". Nmtltics Anonymous does not conduct "'business~' at the Tu1·r1er
House. Since Nw-cotics Anonymous does not conduct "busine!s'~ at the Tumer House. it ·would be
imi,ossiblc for Plaintiff to attend a N~eotics Anonymous meeting at the Turner House fur a purpose

oonnected with "business" conducted by Narcotics Anonymous.
Plaintiff' rnAy !u·gue that NQ!'Codcs Anonymous iJ a business simply because it pays Mnt for
apac,: in the Tumor House to have a meeting. Pollowing that reasoning, any family that 1-ents a house
to live in would

be a business and soohd guests woutd be invitees. This would essentiaHy eliminate

the ct:regory of licensees.

The undi1puted facts in this mattt.r prove that Plaintiff' wns a licensee as to Nw-cotfos

A sig,:dflcru1t portion of'Plaintifrs objecdott is focused on arguing ihat Plaintiff was an lnvitt"e

of Turner House. 'fhese arguments are outside of Narcotics A11onymous' s motion for partial
1ummary judg»'lent iuid only ir1vulve the relationship be:twi-en Turner House and Plaint.Ht Should

this Cnurt entertain these arguments at the hearlng on August 18, 20 l4i then Narcotics Anonymous
IU!PL\" 1'0 PLAINr1~1rFiS OIJJECrION TO THIRD PAU.TV DEFENDANT'S MO'I''lON
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reserves the right to address them at that tlme.

UI. CONCLUSION

should be stricken.

'rhe Plaintiff's own evidence proves that Ntirootics A11011ymou, was not conducting iu1y

butdness at rum.er House and that Plaintiff\vas 11t,t coming to the Narootics Aonymous meeting tor
any business purpose, 11,erefore.• Ntll'COtics Anonymous only ,-,wed Phdntiffthe duty ow'ed to a
licensee,,

~
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

DONNA SIMONO,
Case No. CV-2013-209
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER, AND DOES I
THROUGHX,
Defendants.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
TREASURE VALLY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.
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Third-Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before the Court for oral
argument on August 18, 2014.
Appearnnces:
Sheli Fulcher Koontz for Plaintiff
Stanley J. Tharp for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs
Ryan B. Peck for Third-Party Defendants
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts in this case have been set forth in prior decisions of this Court1, and will not be
repeated at length here. In summary, Plaintiff claims she was injured falling on stairs in Turner
House after attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting organized by Third-Party Defendants.
Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence (among other claims) against Defendants. On July 16,
2014, a pretrial conference was held in this matter. Due to a conflict with another scheduled trial
with priority, the Court vacated the trial. However, prior to the pretrial conference, the parties
had submitted proposed jury instructions, which included instructions related to Plaintiffs
negligence/premises liability claims. Both Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiffs/Defendants
submitted instructions on Plaintiff's status at the time she was visiting Turner House for the
Narcotics Anonymous meeting on January 7, 2013. 2 Third-Party Defendants have moved for
partial summary judgment asking the Court to determine that Plaintiff was not an invitee at the
time of the injury, but was instead a licensee.3
Third-Party Defendants filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 10,
2014, along with an affidavit of counsel. 4 Third-Party Plaintiffs/Defendants filed a response on
Aug. 5, 2014, in which they joined with Third-Party Defendants' arguments, also contending that
Plaintiff should be considered a licensee with regard to them as well as to Third-Party
Defendants. 5

See Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Narcotics Anonymous' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed Mar. 20, 2014.
2
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 10, 2014, p. 2.
3
Id., p. 3.
4
Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck, filed Jul. 10, 2014.
5
Third-Party Plaintiffs' Response to Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
Aug. 5, 2014, p. 2.
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Plaintiff filed an objection to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Aug. 11,
20146 with an affidavit of counsel.7 Plaintiff contends that at the time of her visit to Turner
House, she was not a licensee, but instead was an invitee

a matter of

"

8

Though

Plaintiff's objection was filed Aug. 11 2014, it was signed and allegedly served by fax to the
other parties on Aug. 8, 2014.9
Third-Party Defendants filed a Reply on Aug. 11, 2014. 10 Contained in this Reply is an
argument that the Court should strike Plaintiff's objection and affidavits, as they were untimely
filed and served. 11 No motion to shorten time to hear the Motion to Strike was filed, nor was the
Motion to Strike noticed for hearing. Plaintiffs counsel, E. Lee Shlender, filed two affidavits on
Aug. 14, 2014 explaining why the Plaintiffs responsive briefs were late and further indicating
that Plaintiff has no objection to resetting the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 12
The Court has considered the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Objection, the
Reply, and all supporting documents filed with the Court.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002)
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The court must construe the evidence liberally and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 P.3d 94, 9798 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are such that

6

Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014.
7
Affidavit of Shell Fulcher Koontz in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure
Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
filed Aug. 11, 2014.
8
Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 10.
9
Id., p. 11.
10
Reply to Plaintiff's Objection to Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Objection, filed Aug. 11, 2014.
11
Id., p. 2.
12
Affidavit of E. Lee Shlender Regarding: Additional Time to File Objection and Affidavit Regarding Third
Party- Defendant's [sic] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 14, 2014; Affidavit of E. Lee Shlender
Regarding: Additional Time to File Objection and Affidavit re: Third Party-Defendant's [sic] Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 14, 2014.
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not available.
Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622,625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact,

then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. When the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of
material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. See Sanders v. Kuna
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). "Such an absence of evidence

may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by
a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element
is lacking." Id. at fn. 2. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may
consist of affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ... which is
based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. State, Dep 't
of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the evidence

reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on which the
court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho,
138 Idaho 443,445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).
ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike
Third-Party Defendants filed a document titled "Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Third
Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs
Objection." In this document, Third-Party Defendants ask the Court to disregard Plaintiff's
Objection filed on Aug. 11, 2014, as it was untimely. 13 Third-Party Defendants argue because the
hearing for the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was scheduled for August 18, 2014, the
Plaintiffs responsive briefmg was due 14 days before the hearing, or August 4, 2014. See
I.R.C.P. 56(c). Plaintiff instead faxed the responsive briefing to opposing parties on Aug. 8,
2014, which is untimely under the rule.

13

Id.,p. 2.
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There are several reasons why the Court will not address this motion. 14 First, Third-Party
Defendants never noticed the motion for hearing. The Local Rules for the Fourth Judicial District
state,
uv,:uu.,;.:.

all counties

this District, only those civil matters which have been scheduled for

by the clerks as provided by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules S(a) and

7(b), I.R.C.P., will be heard by the court." Local Rule 2.2 (emphasis added). Further, I.R.C.P.
7(b)(3)(D) states, "If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion, and does
not file a brief within fourteen (14) days, the court may deny such motion without notice if the
court deems the motion has no merit." The Motion to Strike itself does not indicate that oral
argument is requested. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). Even if oral argument were requested, a motion
such as this must be served at least 14 days prior to the hearing. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A). Because the
Motion to Strike has not been noticed, and no request has been made to the Court to change the
time limits for hearing the Motion to Strike, the Motion to Strike is itself untimely and improper.
The Court has no basis upon which to review the motion.
Second, the motion is combined with a memorandum. While the Rules of Civil Procedure
do not absolutely prohibit a motion from being combined with a memo, see I.R.C.P. 7(b ), the
local rules do. Local Rule 8.1 states, "Unless ordered otherwise by the court, each motion and
response to such motion, other than a routine or uncontested matter, must be accompanied by a
separate memorandum, not to exceed twenty-five (25) pages, containing all of the reasons and
points and authorities relied upon by the moving party." In this case, not only is the Motion to
Strike itself combined with the memorandum, the Motion is combined with the Reply brief for
the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. By combining a motion to strike and memo with a
reply brief on a separate motion, a party risks having the motion to strike be overlooked or
ignored. Further, it no longer looks to the Court for an application for an order, see I.R.C.P.
7(b)(l), but instead looks like a request for the Court to disregard evidence. A request to strike
evidence need not be made by motion. See Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho
778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992). However, the current motion is one to strike a

14

The Court notes that a failure to rule on a motion is deemed to be a denial. See Ball v. City ofBlackfoot,
152 Idaho 673,677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) ("The trial court's failure to rule on the City's motion to strike
amounts to a denial of that motion.") (citing Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375,380,234 P.3d 699,
704 (2010)).
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response and supporting affidavits on untimeliness, and not a request to ignore inadmissible
evidence. Therefore, a separate motion must be brought and noticed. Since that did not occur in
case, the Court has no basis for striking the Plaintiff's responsive briefing.
Finally, even if

were to address the Motion to Strike, the Court would deny it

on the grounds of harmless error. The Supreme Court has stated that untimely affidavits are
properly stricken. See Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1004
(2012), reh'g denied (June 7, 2012). There is no allegation from Third-Party Defendants that the
Plaintiff's untimely filings in any way prejudiced Third-Party Defendants from being able to
respond in a meaningful manner. Absent prejudice, there is no need for a draconian application
of timing laws. See Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317, 870 P.2d at 670; McClure

Eng'g, Inc., v. Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 955, 155 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Ct. App. 2006). In
this case, no prejudice was alleged, nor does the Court see how prejudice was caused. Further,
the Third-Party Defendants adequately replied to the Plaintiff's responsive briefing, and in a
timely manner. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, would not strike the Plaintiff's responsive
briefing as prejudicial. Further, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 61, any error that occurred in late filing was
harmless.
B. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

This case includes a negligence claim based on premises liability. Third-Party Defendants
leased space in Turner House, and in turn, allowed Narcotics Anonymous participants to attend
I

meetings in that leased space. Ms. Simono attending those meetings, and was injured. Ms.
Simono has alleged negligence, which has four elements: "(1) a duty, recognized by law,
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss
or damage." Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007).

In this case, because it is a premises liability case, "duty of owners and possessors of land is
determined by the status of the person injured on the land (i.e., whether the person is a [sic]
invitee, licensee or trespasser)." Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814,
816 (1994). The parties dispute whether Ms. Simono was an invitee or licensee at the time of the

lllJUry.
In a negligence case, both the Court and the jury have responsibilities in determining
whether all four elements have been established. "Generally, the question of whether a duty
MEMORA.t~UM DECISION DENYING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIALSUMMARYJUDGMENT
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is a question of law." O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49, 51, 122 P.3d 308, 310
(2005). Thus, it is

not the jury's role to determine whether a duty exists. Instead, the jury

determines whether a breach of duty caused the plaintiffs damages. All
u.1;,c,uu,,.,.

of fact.

Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho

these issues are

851, 908 P.2d 143, 153 (1995); Davis v.

McDougall, 94 Idaho 61, 63, 480 P.2d 907, 909 (1971); Hanks v. Sawtelle Rentals, Inc., 133
Idaho 199, 203, 984 P.2d 122, 126 (1999). Thus, it is arguably the Court's responsibility to
determine the duty. However, it is not the Court's responsibility to determine what duty exists;
only "whether a duty exists." In this case, the parties do not dispute that a duty existed. Instead,
they dispute the level of duty that exists. Therefore, the Court is not being called upon to
determine whether a duty exists, but what level of duty exists. The level of duty can tum on
questions of fact.
The Idaho Supreme Court has given a detailed explanation of duties that arise in premises
liability cases.
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be
said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the landowner. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959). A
landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Bates v. Eastern Idaho
Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252, 253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988). A
licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the
landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. See Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho
227, 281 P. 371 (1929); Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369
(Ct.App.1987). Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee. Wilson, 81 Idaho at
545,' 347 P.2d at 347. The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only
required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or
activities on the land. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. Additionally, this
Court has held that "[t]he fact that a guest may be rendering a minor, incidental
service to the host does not change the relationship [between them as a landowner
and a licensee]." Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 851; see also Mooney v.
Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,471 P.2d 63 (1970).

Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397,400,871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). Plaintiff contends that
whether a person is a licensee or an invitee is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.

15

15

Plaintiffs Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 6.
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The Court could not find any Idaho case directly on point. However, other authorities do state

The question of whether one suing for damages for personal injuries was a
licensee or invitee of the defendant is a question for the jury where the status
depends upon issues of fact created by a contrariety of evidence, but the question
of whether undisputed facts, essential to determination of the plaintiff's status,
show him or her to be a licensee or invitee is a legal question for the court.
62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability§ 85. Further, Idaho law implies that licensee or invitee status
is a question of fact. The Supreme Court in Holzheimer found that it was appropriate for the jury
to be instructed on both licensee and invitee status, as there was evidence presented at trial which
supported both statuses. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. Further, IDJI 3.13
defines who is an invitee, and IDJI 3.15.1 defines who is a licensee. There would be no purpose
to having such instructions if only the Court was responsible for determining such status as a
matter of law, as it could simply instruct the jury on what duty existed. Therefore, premises
liability duties clearly exist as already set forth in law. Which duty applies is a question of fact to
be determined by the jury. If there are any facts which could support a finding of either licensee
or invitee status, summary judgment would not be appropriate.
Third-Party Defendants seek to have this Court declare that Plaintiff Simona was a
licensee. 16 As the moving party, Third-Party Defendants have the burden of establishing that no
facts exist which could support a finding that Plaintiff was an invitee at the time of the injury.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). See also McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,771,820 P.2d 360,366 (1991). Though
not directly on point, Idaho Courts have recognized the duty owed by a landlord to a tenant.
The law recognizes that owner/landlords owe duties to their tenants and their
tenants' employees to exercise reasonable care (1) "in light of all the
circumstances," Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984),
(2) "for protection [from a dangerous condition] even though the dangerous
condition is known and obvious to the employee," Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), and (3) "to provide safe
conditions for employment upon the premises." Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho
867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988). These duties of the owner/landlord are based
on the landlord/tenant relationship with the tenant and the tenant's employees.
Because an owner/landlord exercises control of his building, he also bears
responsibility for foreseeable injuries to the tenants and their employees resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care. Id.
16

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 10, 2014, p. 3.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
8

Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 304, 796 P.2d 506, 513 (1990). The
rule are essentially the same as a duty owed

owed

an invitee. As stated above, this rule is

not directly applicable, because Simono was neither a tenant nor an employee

a tenant.

Neither party has alleged that the duties owed to a tenant translate to the tenant's customers or
attendees, so the Court will not address whether such a duty applies to Simono.
Instead, the parties focus on why Plaintiff was present at Turner House on the evening
she was injured. This goes directly to the issues discussed in Holzheimer. There is little dispute
about why Plaintiff was at Turner House that evening: Plaintiff was attending a Narcotics
Anonymous meeting. 17 This does not clearly make her a social guest, who is generally deemed a
licensee. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959). Nor does it clearly
make her a business guest, who is generally deemed an invitee. Id. 18 Simono falls somewhere in
"between. In order to prevail on summary judgment, Third-Party Defendants would have to prove
that there is nothing upon which a jury could rely to determine that Plaintiff entered "upon the
premises of another for a purpose connected with business there conducted, or whose visit may
reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the [owner/occupant]." IDJI 3.13.
Third-Party Defendants attempt to argue that Simono, as a matter of law, is a licensee,
relying on the following language:
The weight of authority holds that a social guest, though specifically invited,
stands in the legal relationship to his host of a licensee, to whom the host owes the
duty of reasonable and ordinary care only. The fact that the guest may be
rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the relationship.
Nor is the relationship changed by the fact that the guest and the host may have a
mutual or common interest in the purpose of the visit, such as the service of a
church, lodge, or political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host.
Wilson at 545,347 P.2d at 347 (citations omitted, emphasis added). As stated above, Simono was
not a social guest. The Court does not accept that the fact that Simona was attending a Narcotics

17

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Jul. 10, 2014, p. 2; Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party
Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 4.
18
"Where a person enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business there
conducted, or the visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business; commercial, monetary or other
tangible benefit to the occupant, the visitor is held to be an invitee." Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545,347 P.2d at 347.
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Anonymous meeting, which involved a mutual or common interest between Simono and ThirdParty Defendants,

her into a social guest to which this rule may apply. The Court

does not accept that Simono went to Turner House as a visitor and happened to be discussing
Narcotics Anonymous issues on the side. Therefore, she is not a social guest as a matter of law,
either with regard to Defendants or Third-Party Defendants.
The Court believes that there are a number of facts which a jury could utilize to find that
Plaintiff was an invitee as to both Defendants and Third-Party Defendants. Third-Party
Defendants rented space from Turner House for Narcotics Anonymous meetings and Plaintiff
attended those Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Based on this, a jury could conclude that Ms.
Simono entered Turner House for a purpose connected with the business there conducted (i.e.
Turner House rented out the property to be used for meetings, and Plaintiff attending the
meetings). Narcotics Anonymous also collected money, in the form of donations, from its
participants to pay rent to Turner House, 19 and a jury could :find that Plaintiff's visit to Turner
House resulted in a business benefit to both Defendants and Third-Party Defendants. It is up to
the jury to determine whether Plaintiff conferred a business benefit, rendering her an invitee, or
instead provided "a minor, incidental service to the host," see Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d
at 347, and that she is merely a licensee. There is no error in instructing the jury on both licensee
and invitee status, particularly where there is evidence to support both statuses. Holzheimer, 125
Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
cannot therefore be granted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Jul. 10, 2014, is
DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this

18th

day of August, 2014.

Ly~
District Judge
19

Plaintiffs Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 4; Koontz Affidavit, Ex. 3,
pp. 21.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10

71

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing .....v.., . . .u...... was sent to
following:
Sheli Fulcher Koontz
LAW-IDAHO PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101
Boise, ID 83702
U.S.MAIL
E. Lee Schlender
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICES
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, ID 83647
U.S.MAIL
Stanley J. Tharp
EBERLE, BERLINE, KADING,
TURNBOW & MCKLVEEN, CHTD.
1111 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 530
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
U.S.MAIL
Rodney R. Saetrum
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box 7425
Boise, ID 83707
U.S.MAIL
Dated this 19th day of August, 2014.

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

B~-Deputy Clerk

u

ORIQIN

<

I

Stanley J. Tharp, ISB #3883

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED
1111 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 530
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8535
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542
Attorneys for Turner House, Larry Rogers
and Cheryl Barker

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

DONNA SIMONO,

Case No. CV 2013-209
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTSffIDRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

v.
TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER, and DOES I through X,
Defendants.
TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS and
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
V.

TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF
NARCOTICS Ai"JONYMOUS and
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.

DEFENDANTSrrHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 1
83041-26 I 00507073.000

73

DATED this 29th day of October, 2014.
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

By__S_~.....,_e...;.iy~'d~arp-~--',~fth_e_firm
_ _ _ _ __
Attorneys for Turner House,
Larry J. Rogers and Cheryl Barker

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
was served upon the following attorney(s) this 29th day of October§, 2014, as indicated below
and addressed as follows:
Sheli Fulcher Koontz
LAW-IDAHO PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[ ]
[ ]
[ v"]
[v"]

U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 888-9970
Hand Delivery
Email Transmission

[ ]
[ ]
[v"]
[v"]

U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 587-3535
Hand Delivery
Email Transmission

[ ]
[ ]
["]
["]

U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 336-0448
Hand Delivery
Email Transmission

Attorneys for Plaintiff

E. Lee Schlender
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICES
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Rodney R. Saetrum / Ryan B. Peck
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
3046 S. Bown Way
Post Office Box 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants

DEFENDANTS/THlRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 2
83041-26 / 00507073 .000
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in this lawsuit now before us. The first
thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and, perhaps, one or two alternate jurors from among
you ladies and gentlemen.
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court marks
the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The bailiff will assist me
in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after this case has been submitted
to you for decision. The court reporter will keep a verbatim account of all matters of record
during the trial.
To assist both you and the attorneys in this process of selection of a jury, I will introduce
you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about.
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit the plaintiff is Donna
Simono. The plaintiff is represented by Lee Schlender. The party against whom a lawsuit is
brought is called a "defendant." In this matter the defendant is Larry Rogers, represented by
Stanley Tharp; and Third-Party Defendant is Narcotics Anonymous, represented by Rodney
Saetrum and Ryan Peck.
This is a civil case involving a claim for damages arising when Ms. Simono fell on the
stairs at Turner House in downtown Mountain Home. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rogers
was negligent in not having adequate lighting in the stairway the evening the Plaintiff fell. The
Defendant Rogers contends that there was adequate lighting and the Plaintiff fell because of her
own comparable negligence.
A trial starts with the selection of a jury. The purpose of the law is to obtain a fair and
impartial jury. The court and the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you

DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 3
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any information concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which either of the lawyers
believes might cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other.
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but

are not

intended to embarrass you.

If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do understand the
question, you should answer freely.
The clerk of the court will now swear you in for the jury examination.

IDJI 1.00 (modified)

Given- - - Refused
Modified- - - Covered
Other- - - -

----

----

Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you

the issues to be decided.

IDJI 1.05

Given
Refused- - - -

----

Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - -

Judge
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JNSTRUCTION NUMBER 3
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Now that you have been sworn, I will briefly tell you something about your duties as
jurors and give you some instructions. At the end of the trial I will give you more detailed
instructions, and those instructions will control your deliberation.
It will be your duty to decide from the evidence what the facts are. You and you alone,
are the judges of the facts. You will hear the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply
those facts to the law which I will give to you. That is how you will reach your verdict. In doing
so you must follow the law whether you agree with it or not.
You must not take anything I may say or do during the trial as indicating what your
verdict should be. Don't be influenced by my taking notes at times. What I write down may
have nothing to do with what you will be concerned with at this trial.

Given- - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge

DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 6
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to
facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state the
law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The
order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. The
law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy
nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these
duties is vital to the administration of justice.

In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At
times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness'
answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of
law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an
exhibit, the witness may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown.
Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which should
apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will excuse you
from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any problems. You are not
to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the trial
run more smoothly.

DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 7
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Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct evidence"
"hearsay evidence. Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to consider all the

However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of
the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it. There
is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you to this
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs you
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you attach
to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making
these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations.
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses

may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that
matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are not
bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.

IDJI 1.00 (modified)

Given---Refused
---Modified- - - Covered---Other

----

Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5
The Defendant Rogers asserts that the lighting conditions on the stairs were adequate and
had never been any complaints to him about inadequate lighting since Narcotics
Anonymous started holding meetings there in early 2010.
The Defendant Rogers asserts that he was not negligent, but rather, it was the negligence
of Ms. Simono that was the proximate cause of her fall and injuries.

IDJI 1.07 (modified)

Given- - - Refused- - Modified- - - Covered- - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the same
consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.

IDJI 1.22

Given----Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered---Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
,....,.,,.""""' a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for
such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI 1.24.2

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified
Covered- - - Other

----

----

Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression

I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

IDJI 1.20.1

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9
It was the duty of all persons, including the plaintiff Ms.
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous, before and at

Defendant Rogers, and
time of the occurrence, to use

ordinary care for the safety of themselves and each other.

IDJI 2.00.3 (modified)

Given- - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER l 0

When I use the word "negligence"
care

these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary

the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a

reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act wider those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

IDJI 2.20

Given- - - Refused
---Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained

natural or probable
It need not

the only

cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.

IDJI 2.30.2

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12
On the issue of negligence, the plaintiff Ms.

...,u,,i,n_,...,

the burden to

each

the

propositions:

L A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendants to conform to a certain
standard of conduct;

2. A breach of that duty;
3. A causal connection between the conduct of Defendant Rogers and Third-Party
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous and the resulting injuries to plaintiff Ms.
Simono; and

4. Actual loss or damage.
You will be asked the following question on the jury form: "Was there negligence on the
part of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous, which was the
proximate cause of plaintiffs damages?"

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the
propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you should answer the jury question
''yes." If you find that any of these propositions has not been proved, you should answer the
question "no."

IDJI 1.41.2 (modified)

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13

In this case, the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous have

each of the following propositions:
1. The plaintiff was negligent.
2. The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: "Was the plaintiff
Donna Simono negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of her
injuries?"

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendants have not met their burden of proof required
and you should answer this question ''No."

IDJI 1.41.4.2 (modified)

Given· - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 14
You must decide from the evidence if Rogers knew, or by the exercise
~u~--have kno\vn, of the existence

reasonable care

inadequate lighting on the stairs.

Rogers must have had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in
order to establish a breach of the duty of care.

Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 777-78, 251 P.3d 602, 605-06 (2011).

Given- - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15
A person fails to exercise ordinary care for her own safety when she does something or
to do something under circumstances

which a reasonable person would foresee that by

her action or failure to act, she will subject a person or property to an unreasonable risk of injury
or damage. Thus, when a reasonable person knows or should know that a course of conduct
poses substantial, inherent risks, yet the person persists in the conduct voluntarily and suffers
injury as a result, the person will not be permitted to recover from someone who is less negligent.
If you find that Ms. Simono engaged in conduct that contributed to her injury, you must

find that Ms. Simono's conduct was negligent, in some degree.

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified----Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected
business there

or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a

business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the occupant.

IDJI 3.13

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 17
An occupant owes a duty of ordinary care under all circumstances towards invitees who
come upon the premises.

duty extends to all portions

premises to which an invitee

may reasonably be expected to go.

IDJI 3.09

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 21
83041-26 I 00507073.000

ii

INSTRUCTION NUMBER 18
A licensee is a visitor that goes upon the premises of another with
landlord

the pursuit

consent of the

a visitor's purpose. A duty owed to a licensee is narrow.

landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or
activities on the land.

Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012)

Given' - - - Refused- - - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 22
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19
licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's
the consent of the occupant or owner. The consent

the occupant or owner may

be implied from the circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises. .

IDJI 3.15.1

Given- - - Refused- - - Modified- - - Covered---Other- - - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 20
Tenants owe a duty

ordinary care under all circumstances towards invitees who come

the premises.

Harrison v. Tay!or, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989).
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 (1994).

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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83041-26 / 00507073.000

h

INSTRUCTION NUMBER 21
A tenant is to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for its invitees even though
the landlord has covenanted to maintain the premises.

Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 (1994).

Given- - - -

Refused- - Modified- - - Covered- - - Other- - - -

Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 22
The tenant cannot, by the terms of the lease, be discharged from the duty to its guests or
customers of caring for their safety.

Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 (1994).

Given
--Refused- - Modified
"--Covered- - Other

---

Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 23
The tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned,
to

the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the

premises, the general rule is that the tenant may be liable for failure to keep the premises in
repair.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989).

Given
--Refused
--Modified
--Covered- - Other

---

Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 24
The tenant, but not the owner is liable for irtjuries to a third party caused by the condition
or use of the premises so far, at least, as they were under his control. A tenant having control
over the demised premises is deemed, so far as third parties or the public are concerned, to be the
owner, and in cases of injuries to third parties, occasioned by the condition or use of the
premises, it is a general rule, prima facie, breach of duty and therefore the liability is that of the
tenant and not that of the owner.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989).

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 25
Under an ordinary negligence standard of care, the owner or occupier

the premises is

held strictly liable for injuries to persons who enter upon the property. The duty not

be

negligent is only a duty to take reasonable precautions against risk of undue harm.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989).

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 26
An owner owes a duty not to cause intentional or reckless harm to persons or property on

premises.

IDJI 3.01

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 27
owner of property owes a duty to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition

IDJI 3.05

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 28
The owner owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on the land
were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee.

IDil3.15

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 29
......u.,...u.

that contains all of the elements of a contract is a binding contract.

6.06.5

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 30
A contract

written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So

long as all the required elements are present, it makes no different whether the agreement

writing.

IDJI 6.06.1

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 31
contract is an agreement between two or more parties to

or not

something that is

supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

Valid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the above elements are present in the contract alleged in this case.

IDJI 6.01.1 (modified)

Given- - Refused
Modified- - Covered
Other

---

---

---

Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 32
Rogers and Barker have the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
1.

contract existed between Rogers and Barker and Narcotics Anonymous;

2. Narcotics Anonymous breached the contract;
3. Rogers and Barker have been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions
required of Rogers and Barker has been proved, then you mu;,t consider the issue of the
affirmative defenses raised by Narcotics Anonymous. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict
should be for Narcotics Anonymous on the breach of contract claim.

IDil 6.10.l (modified)

Given' - - Refused
--Modified
--Covered
---Other- - Judge
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 33
"material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach
defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract.

Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993)
IDJI 6.11

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTSJTHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 37
83041-26 / 00507073.000
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 34
giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do

express

opinion as

damages.

IDJI 9.00

Given---Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 38
83041-26 I 00507073.000
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 35
When I use

"value" or the phrase "fair market value" in these instructions as to

services rendered, I mean the amount of money that a willing employer would pay and a willing
employee would accept for the services in question, under circumstances as existed immediately
prior to the occurrence in question, in an open marketplace.

IDil 9.12

Given· - - Refused---Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 39
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 36
person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize
further damage.

damage and

loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot

recovered.

rnn 9.14 (modified)

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 40
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 37
Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. The existence and extent

damages

Anderson v. Nafziger v. GT Newcomb, Inc.,
100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 (1979)

Given
"--Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/I'HIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 41
83041-26 / 00507073.000
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 38
jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from either or both defendants, the
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate

plaintiff

for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the negligence of such defendant(s).
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:

A.

B.

Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and sufferL."lg, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

Economic damages
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses
incurred as a result of the injury.

Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
IDJI 9.01 (modified)

Given· - - Refused- - Modified- - - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 42
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 39
deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any
ues1non by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the
damage award or percentage of negligence.

IDil 1.09

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTSffHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 43
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 40
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding

matters that

may consider

weighing the evidence to determine the facts.

a few minutes

counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself, but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI 1.13
Given---Refused- - Modified---Covered- - Other---Judge

DEFENDANTSrrHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 44
83041-26 I 00507073.000

51fi

..
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 41
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They are part
official court record. For this reason, please do not alter them or mark them

any way.

The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There
may or may not be a gap in the number of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern
yourselves about such gap.

Given- - Refused---Modified---Covered---Other---Judge

DEFENDANTS/flDRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 45
83041-26 / 00507073 .000
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 42
room, select one of you as a foreman, who will preside over your

An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is anonymous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more,
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the baliff, who will
then retum you into open court.

IDJI 1.15.2

Given
Refused
Modified
Covered- - - Other

---------

---

Judge

DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 46
83041-26 / 00507073.000

518

.,
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 43
it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with

a

signed by one or more

may send

you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me

by any means other than such a note.

During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

IDJI 1.11

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 47
83041-26 / 00507073.000
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1

9

•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 44
this case you will be given a special verdict form to use
consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I

returning

verdict. This

read the verdict form to you

now.

IDJI 1.43.1

Given- - Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - Judge

DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 48
83041-26 I 00507073.000
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 45
this case you will return a special verdict, consisting of a series of questions which
".IU'"'' ..........

answer. In answering each question you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence

in the case, that your choice of answers is more probably true than not true.
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as follows:
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers which was a
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages?
Answer to Question No.1:

Yes L_]

No L_]

Proceed to Question No. 2.
Question No. 2: Was there negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area
of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs damages?
Answer to Question No. 2:

Yes L_]

No L_]

If your answers to both Questions No. 1 and 2 are "No," do not answer any further questions.
Simply sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If your answer to either or both of Questions No. 1
and 2 is "Yes," proceed to Question No. 3.

Question No. 3: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages?
Answer to Question No. 3:

Yes L_]

No [__J

Proceed to Question No. 4.
Question No. 4: You are now to apportion the fault of the parties in terms of a percentage. Insert
the percentage of negligence of each party, if any, which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's
damages. Your percentages must total I 00%.
a)
Plaintiff Donna Simono
%
b)
Defendant Larry Rogers
%
c)
Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous
DEFENDANTS/fBIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 49
83041-26 / 00507073.000

'1 ? 1

•
Proceed to Question No. 5.
Question No. 5: We assess the Plaintiffs damages as follows:
$_ _ _ __

Economic Damages
Non-Economic Damages

a)

b)

$_ _ _ __

Total Damages:

$_ _ _ __

Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff.

IDll 1.43.l

__

Given
Refused- - Modified- - Covered- - Other- - ;...._

Judge

DEFENDANTSffHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 50
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IN"STRUCTION NUMBER 46
now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the

Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like
about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions.

If anyone persists in

discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after
any discussion has begun, you may report it to me.

IDJI 1.17

Given
--Refused- - - Modified- - Covered
--Other

----

Judge

DEFENDANTSrrHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 51
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OF THB ST~TE.OF IDAHO, IN AND. FQR.THE COUNTY OF ELMORE ''
DONNA SIMONO,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS/THlRD;..PARTY

v.

PLAtNTIJi'FS! ADDITIONAL

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY l ROGERS.
CHERYL BARKER. and DOES t through X,

PROPOSEDJURYlNSTaUCTION
'
.
'

Defendants.
TURNBR HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS and
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.
TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS and
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS LITERATURE,
Third~Party Defendants.
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DATED this 30th day of October, 2014.

EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING. TURNBOW
& McKLVEEN, CHARTERED

BY~-S-tan
.....
~-ey~
.....J•.T-~,,,._,...,o~,_ft....,.,...i-1nn----~~--Attorneys for Turner House,
Larry J. Rogers and Cheryl Barker
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregojng document
was served upon the following attorney(s) this 30th day of October, 2014, as indicated below and
addressed as follows:
Sheli Fulcher Koontz
LAW-IDAHO PLLC
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101
Boise, Idaho 83702

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[-I']

U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 888-9970
Hand Delivery
Email Transmission

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ¥"']

U.S. Mail
Fax (208) 587-3535
Hand Delivery
Email Transmission

1

Attorneyafor Plaintl/f

E. Leo Schlender
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICES
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Attornepafor Plaintiff

Rodney R. Saetrum / Ryan B. Peck
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
3046 S. Bown Way
Post Office Box 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax (208) 336-0448
[ ] .Hand Delivery
[./] Email Transmission

Attorneys for Third Patty Dej'e11da'flt8

-~------------~S=tan=ley';4.~i~£=-"''---)-~--1--?------
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 47

The owner owes a duty to wam a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on

land

were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee.

Chapman v. Chapman, 141 ldaho 156 (2009).

Given

---R.efused.~~~

---

Modified
Covered
Other- - -

----

Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
DONNA SIMONO,
Case No. CV~2013-209
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER

TURNER HOUSE, IARRY J. ROGERS,
AND DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.
TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.

Appearances:
Ervin Schlender and Sheli Fulcher Koontz for Plaintiff
Stanley J. Tharp for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs
Ryan B. Peck for Third-Party Defendants

Final Pretrial Order
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This trial has been reset multiple times. In July, trial had to be reset due to a criminal
case tried at that time. This matter is currently set for a five-day jury trial.
This matter came before the Court again for a final pretrial conference on November 3,
2014. This is case is currently still set with three other cases to begin December 2, 2014. The
Court has one criminal trial set to begin December 2, 2014 which could take priority on the
court's calendar. The other three matters are civil cases and this case has first priority among the
civil cases because of its age and prior trial delay.

The Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings
filed August 22, 2014 is further amended as follows:

·

Assuming the criminal case resolves, the court anticipates Judge Norton will
try this case beginning on Tuesday, December 2, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
with the jury beginning at 8 a.m. that morning and the parties present at.
8:30 a.m.; Wednesday, December 3, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.; the trial will

skip Thursday, December 4, 2014 because of matters set in A~a County; then
resume Friday, December 5, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.; the trial will skip
Monday, December 8, 2014; then resume Tuesday, December 9, 2014 from 9
a.m. to 5 p.m.; and conclude Wednesday, December 10, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5
p.m.
If the court needs to further amend the trial schedule because of the double-set

criminal trial, the co0:rt will send out an amended pretrial order.
At the pretrial conference, the court and parties discussed whether there were stipulations
to the admissibility of evidence, stipulations of facts, or an exchange of exhibits. The parties are
to meet and confer before the trial related to these stipulations and to review the other party.' s

Final Pretrial Order
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'/
exhibits so these matters can be presented to the court on the morning the trial begins. The
Plaintiff, the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, and Third-Party Defendants had filed proposed
instructions, exhibit lists, and witness lists at the previous pretrial conference. Some
materials were supplemented at this pretrial conference. The Plaintiff should mark exhibits with
numbers; the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs should mark their exhibits with letters A through
YY; the Third-Party Defendants should mark theirs with Roman numerals. The parties should
contact Judge Norton's Elmore County Clerk, Heather Furst, if there are any additional questions
about marking exhibits.
Third-Party Defendant NA's motions in limine and Defendants' Request for Ruling on
Objections at Videotaped Trial Deposition are currently pending before the court and will be
heard at 3 p.m. on November 17, 2014. Previously filed motions in limine were decided March
17, 2014. Counsel for the Third-Party Defendants has requested to appear telephonically and
may appear telephonically by setting up the hearing through Court Call (information on Elmore
County District Court website or by calling the Elmore County District Court Clerk if needed to
set that up).
At the pretrial conference, the Plaintiff dismissed Cheryl Barker as a Defendant.
The Plaintiff had twenty-two witnesses on their witness list but anticipates calling ten or
eleven witnesses; the Defendants anticipate calling up to seven witnesses disparate from those
identified by the Plaintiff and did not delineate which are in the defense case-in-chief, compared
to which are for the Third-Party Plaintiffs case-in-chief; the Third-Party Defendant anticipates
calling one witness disparate from the other parties' witnesses. The parties were not aware of
any specific scheduling conflict with witnesses. Any specific scheduling conflicts of witnesses

Final Pretrial Order
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should be noticed to the court, with that notice also provided to the other parties, in advance of

Proposed

instructions have been filed and the court will distribute a collated draft of

jury instructions to the handling counsel for each party at the e-mail address entered in the Idaho
State Bar Directory prior to the commencement of the trial. If the parties desire they be sent to a
different e-mail address or prefer a hard copy, they should contact the District Court Clerk.
A panel of 75 jurors will be assembled by the jury commissioner. Since this is a fiveday trial but without consecutive days, the jury will include two alternate jurors. The court will
use a struck jury with two alternate jurors so each the Plaintiff will receive 7 peremptory
challenges, the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs will receive 7 peremptory challenges, and the
Third-Party Defendants will receive 7 peremptory challenges, for an initial panel of 35 jurors.
The jury list in random order is only available in paper copy and will be available to the parties
at the Elmore County Courthouse the week of Thanksgiving. Contact the District Court Clerk
about availability or if you want to observe the random draw. Each party will have a maximum
of 45 minutes each for the party's voir dire.
The Court discussed the presentation of evidence. Presentation of a video deposition is
anticipated. If the parties intend to use computer or other electronic devices in the courtroom
during the trial, they must provide the device for the courtroom and also note that public wi-fi or
internet access is not available in the Elmore County Courthouse. If a powerpoint or other
digital presentation is presented to the court, the version presented to the court must be saved
on a CD and given to the Clerk for preservation in the court file.
If the parties reach a settlement in this case prior to trial, such settlement must be in

writing and conform to the requirements of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54, 60 and 75. A trial

Final Pretrial Order
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•
not be vacated until all settlement documents are filed with the court and the court
approves such settlement. Any settlement documents must be filed in Elmore County.

the court is

Ada

the week before this trial and will be in hearings in Elmore

County all day on Monday just before this trial is set to begin, there is only limited availability to
review settlements. Please plan accordingly.
While Judge Norton maintains chambers in both Elmore County and Ada County,
Elmore County matters must be filed in the Elmore County Clerk's Office. The clerk in Ada
County is not responsible for taldng, forwarding, or answering questions on behalf of Elmore
County. All matters must be filed with the District Court Clerk in Elmore County with, chambers
copies delivered electronically to both lnorton@adaweb.net and hfurst@elmorecounty.org.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this t ) ~ y of November, 2014.

Lynn~trictJud

5

Final Pretrial Order

531

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

correct copy of the foregoing aocmmtent was sent to the

E. Lee Schlender
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Sheli Fulcher Koontz
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101
Boise, ID 83702
Stanley J. Tharp
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, ID 83701
Ryan Peck
P.O. Box 7425
Boise, ID 83707
Dated this 7th day of November, 2014.

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

B~l'1~
De~Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTU"'rtj.~h~
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DEPUTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
DONNA SIMONO,
Case No. CV-2013-209
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDERS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER, AND DOES I
THROUGHX,
Defendants.
TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
TREASURE VALLY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.

Appearances:
E. Lee Schlender for Plaintiff
David Swartley for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs
David Lloyd for Third-Party Defendants

ORDERS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

1

533

four ~otions came bef6.re the court for h~arjng on NovemberJ 7, 2014'. First, there
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be gen~rated by 09jections to the evidence during trial and all()WS counsel, ori botn· sides, to
make strategic deci~ionsJ>efoi'e the ,trial concerning the context and order of th~ evidence to be
presented. Davidspn v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 p.2d 781, 784 ·(1986); Stat~ v.
Young,, 136 Idaho 113,

120, 29 P.3d 949,956 (2001).

Idaho Rule ofEvidence 103(c) directs that

proceedings shall be conducted so as ,to prevent inadmissiMe evidence from being suggested to
the jury, to the extent practicable. The trial court may re~o~sider a motion in limine at any time,
including when the' actual presentation of facts is made. Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83
P.3d 773, 779 (2003).

,\.

A. Third-Party Defendant's Motions in Limine riled 10/29/14

Most of these motions in limine are related to the court's orders in limine decided March
17, 2014.
\

The court denies part A which raises objections to the court's denial of the previous
'

motion to dismiss. Such is not a request to limit the presentation at evidence at trial, but rather a
\.

motion to reconsider this court's previous ruling. As such, it is not a proper motion in limine and
is DENIED.

Part B.1., evidence of settlement negotiations inadmissible under IRE 408 was previously
prohibited by the court's earlier order and any subsequent offers of settlement are incorporated
into that ruling. GRANTED.

Part B.2., evidence of insurance prohibited under IRE 411 was previously prohibited by
the court's earlier order and is still GRANTED.
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Part B.3, request to exclude witnesses and documents which were not disclosed is
DENIED. The court has no idea what witnesses and documents were previously disclosed and
not speculate

ruling on this motion.

The court will not know the parties believe

something was not P,reviously disclosed until there is actually a specific objection at trial.
Therefore, this part of the motion is DENIED.
B. Defendants' Request Ruling on Objections to Video Deposition filed 8/8/14

The court GRANTS the motion as to Page 32, lines 13-21 of the deposition since this
question calls for speculation or an opinion of the declarant' s honesty or accuracy without a basis
for such opinion. The court DENIES the motion excluding presentation of Page 58, lines 13-22,
from the deposition to the jury. The objection at the deposition was form of the question and
speculation. The court finds this response permissible under IRE 803.
C. Plaintiff's Amended Motions in Limine flled 11/7/14

This motion is in two parts: objecting to any reference to the Plaintiff smoking or being a
smoker and objecting to the Department of Labor unemployment compensation records.

1. Smoking
The Plaintiff objects to any information being presented before the jury to the Plaintiff
smoking under Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, or 404. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the Plaintiffs character of "being a smoker'' or "smoking" or her
conformity therewith.

However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that

prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). The admissibility of evidence is generally at this court's discretion.
However, under Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence the court must follow a two-tiered
analysis. First, the court must determine (1) if there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior
bad acts as fact and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue, other
than propensity. First, there is no dispute at the hearing that the Plaintiff smoked during the time
she was in treatment for the injuries alleged in the complaint. Therefore, at this point, the court
finds based on Dr. Kristensen's there is sufficient evidence that the Plaintiff smoked while being
treated for the alleged injuries.
Therefore, it moves to the second determination of relevancy. Whether evidence is
relevant is a matter of law. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." The Defendants raise as their third affirmative defense
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the failure to mitigate and the Third Party Defendants raise as their fourth affirmative defense the
failure to mitigate damages. IDJI 9.14-Mitigation of damages, requested by Defendant in the
proposed instructions, provides "A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to
minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to
exercise such care cannot be recovered." In looking at portions of Dr. Kristensen's testimony
presented as a whole and all of his responses related to the Plaintiff's smoking, the court does
find the testimony that "the literature and experience is pretty clear that smoking does have an
adverse impact on healing" to 1;,e relevant to mitigation of damages. While Dr. Kristensen's
testimony, taken as a whole including page 41, is that the Plaintiff's time of healing was within
normal limits, his testimony is still relevant to the "quality" of her healing, even if not relevant to
the amount of time of the healing. Paragraph 22 of the Complaint seeks special damages for
injuries including pain and suffering, mental anguish and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life,
among other things. Therefore, the evidence that she smoked a half pack a day of cigarettes
during the time of her medical treatment and recovery is relevant to damages on these issues and
the duty to mitigate affirmative defense. Therefore, the court will not exclude this evidence
under I.R.E. 401 as irrelevant.
However, even if the evidence is relevant, the decision to exclude it rests with the
discretion of the court. Next under this analysis, the court must determine whether the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Therefore, this Court must
(1) correctly perceive the issue as discretionary; (2) act within the outer bounds of its discretion
and within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of
reason. The Plaintiff offered as basis for unfair prejudice that there may be jurors who are of a
religious faith that oppose smoking. This is not a sufficient basis to preclude evidence or even
show the probative value of any evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice if
people of faith sit as jurors. The standard for removal of a juror for cause is if there is an actual
bias under Idaho Code§ 19-2019 or implied bias under Idaho Code§ 19-2020. The court will
not presume that every member of the Latter Day Saints (or any other faith group) has an actual
or implied bias against any party that smokes and, is therefore, unable to sit as a juror in any
personal injury case. The parties may inquire into attitudes and bias toward smoking in the
parties' voir dire, but the court will not presume bias. If a juror states an actual or implied bias
meeting the statutory standard for excusal as a juror, it should be raised as a challenge in voir
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As this motion relates to presentation of evidence after the jury is selected, th~ Plaintiff has

shown that the probative value of the statements that smoking may delay healing are
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice that the jury may know that the Plaintiff smokes.
u=,., .............i:a:. is a legal activity-even if unhealthy. There may be prejudice here given the

affirmative defense of mitigation, but the prejudice to the Plaintiff is not unfair in this case.
Given the facts, claims ,and defenses in this case, the fact that the Plaintiff smoked during the
recovery of this injury is relevant and the probative value of that evidence is no substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice-·the standard under Rule 403.
Having determined the evidence is relevant under 401, and not substantially outweighed
by unfair prejudice under 403, the court returns to the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) of whether it
is admissible for a purpose other than to provide conduct to show that Ms. Simono acted in
conformity with "being a smoker" or had the character of "a smoker'' (whatever that might be)
under Rule 404. Smoking tobacco is not a crime. Given the legality of smoking tobacco, the
court isn't even convinced it is a "wrong." So the court will simply analyze it as an "act" under
the rule. That act may be admissible for other purposes and Rule 404(b) does not limit those
purposes to those most frequently 'recited in criminal cases of "proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." I.R.E. 404(b).
The court has already determined that ·the Plaintiff's smoking is admissible for the purpose of
explaining a diminished "quality" of healing relevant to damages for pain and suffering, mental
anguish and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life, as well as relevant to the affirmative defense
of mitigation. This is a permissible purpose pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) that takes it outside of
showing the Plaintiff is of bad character because she engages in the act of smoking tobacco.
Therefore, after applying the standards in I.R.E. 401, 402, 403 and 404, the motion to
limit references to the Plaintiff's smoking as presented in Dr. Kristen's deposition excerpts
presented with the motion in limine and responses are DENIED.

2. Department of Labor records
The Plaintiff stated at the hearing that it is withdrawing any claims to lost wages, past
present or future. The Plaintiff asserts that any Department of Labor records showing the
Plaintiff worked while claiming unemployment are therefore irrelevant under IRE 401. The
Plaintiff has not withdrawn claims for damages including pain and suffering, mental anguish and
grief, and loss of the pleasures of life. On page 13 of the Plaintiff's deposition, the question was
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from Match 30,.2014. through Aligust 26, ·2013. t,hat she was able to work and/or looking for
work, ,siich rec~rds are, admissions .of a party oppdne~t and relevant to damages for pain. and
suffering; ment~
anguish
and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life she is' still claiming.
.
'
'

.

(Swartl~y :Af:fd. Ex..

'

C, pp. 1()0-123). To the extent that it is the Defendant that would seek

admission of:this evidence, the court finds .these statements by the Plaintiff are admissions. of a
party opponent~ admissible pursuant'to IRE 80l(d)(2). Additionally, if the Plaintiff testifies or
'

'

admits her deposition during the Plaintiff's case in chief, such statements may also be admissible
pursuant to I.R.E: 801(d)(l) as prior inconsistent statements by a witness and/or I.R.E. 613.
•

I

To the extent the Defendants are requesting evidence of other portions of the records be.
permitted as impeachment to impeach the. credibility of the Plaintiff, the court reserves such
ruling until after the Plaintiff's testifimony or case-in-chief to determine whether these r,ecords
are admissible and for which purpose(s). (Swartley Affd. Ex. C, pp. 124-185).
This motion is GRANTED IN PART AND RESERVED IN PART.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 19th day of November, 2014.

Lynn Norton
District Judge
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 48
There is no dispute in this case that Bob Foss was the agent

the principal. Treasure

of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature, at the time of the

transaction described by the evi(lence. Therefore, Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous
and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. the principal. is responsible for any act of, Bob Foss, the
agent. within the scope of the agent's authority.

IDJI 6.41.1 (Modified)

Given

---

Refused- - Modified- - Covered

---

Other- - -

Judge
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

DONNA SIMONO,

Case No. CV-2013-209
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DISMISSING CHERYL BARKER
AS DEFENDANT

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER, AND DOES I
THROUGHX,

Defendants.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
TREASURE VALLY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,

Third-Party Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

The Plaintiff has dismissed all c l a ~ r t Defendant Cheryl Barker.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

thi~_d~ayy o
o JfN~-Lyn orton
District Judge

ORDER DISMISSING CHERYL BARKER AS DEFENDANT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

DONNA SIMONO,
Case No. CV-2013-209
Plaintiff,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
AND DOES I THROUGH X,
Defendants.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.

HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON
DISTRICT JUDGE
PRESIDING
1

Given
_Modified
_Not given
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~ PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS
can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each party to the suit is entitled
full and fair consideration,
are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.
You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their
employees, or any of the witnesses.
2
You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case,
you must report it to me promptly.
3.
You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to
deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.
You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and have
received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.
You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater
understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

Members of the Jury, we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you may be unfamiliar
with the procedures in which you are about to participate; I am going, therefore, to outline briefly
for you how this trial will proceed. Now that the jury is selected and sworn, I am going to read to
you some of your instructions. Then the attorneys will make opening statements; the defendant's
attorney may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later. The opening statement is
intended to inform you about the party's case, and what the party claims and what evidence the
party intends to produce for you. The opening statement is not evidence, however.
Then each side offers evidence. The plaintiff proceeds first and offers evidence on the plaintiff's
claim. The defendant then offers evidence on the defendant's claim and defense. Thereafter,
rebuttal evidence may be offered. After the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your
instructions. In those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will
have to decide.
Then the trial concludes with the arguments of the lawyers for both sides. Finally you will be
taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy. I will now give you some of
your instructions to aid you during the course of this trial.
DUTY OF COURT: If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced
by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any
opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
~en
-Modified
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established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard
NOTE TAKING: If you wish, you may take notes to helpyou remember what witnesses said.
do. take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go. to the jury
room to decide the case at the end of the trial. You should not let note-taking distract you so that
you do nothear other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in
the. jury room.

If you do take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said· and not be overly
influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign one person the duty of
taking notes for all of you. If you take notes.during the trial, be careful that your attention is not
thereby diverted from the witness or bis testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.
CONDUCT OF JURORS:
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the
following instructions. at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court
during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night.
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys,
parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. "No discussion" also means no
emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other
form of communication, electronic or otherwise.
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of
the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations.
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown
this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our
culture where we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a
little room together and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just
watched together.
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The frrst is to help you keep an open mind.
When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely
important that you not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence
and all the rules for making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the trial.
The second reason for the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when
you deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you won't
remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors· when
you deliberate at the end of the trial.
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to you about
~iven
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case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because ycnf are a juror. ·If that person
persists, simply walk away ancl report the incident to the bailiff.

Do .not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations
connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the
Internet Do not communicate any private orspedal knowledge about any of the facts of this.
case to yourfellowjurors: Do notread or listen to any news reports about this case or about
anyone involved in this case, .whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio
or television.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and.to "Google''
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their
own research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation
for our system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case
only on the evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or
do outside research duringthe trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors
and you could be held in contempt of court.
·
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell
phones and other means of electronic communications. Should you need to communicate with
me or anyone else during the deliberations, please notify the bailiff.

15
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~ RECESS INSTRUCTION
During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are instructed that you
are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form an opinion as to
the merits of the case until after the case has been submitted to you for your determination.
When I say "discuss this case ... with anyone else," I include in that that you are not to use e-mail,
text messaging, tweeting, blogging, electronic bulletin boards, or any other fofm of
communication, electronic or otherwise, to communicate with others, even including other
jurors, to communicate about this case. You are also not to conduct any personal investigation or
look up any information from any source, including the Internet, during the jury selection, the
trial, or during deliberations. Do not form an opinion as to the merits of the case until after the
case has been submitted to you for your determination.

¢ SHORT FORM RECESS INSTRUCTION
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves
or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally
submit the case to you.

12
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INSTRUCTION NO. _l_
The testimony of Michael Perez and Plaintiff's Exhibits 18, 19. and 20 were admitted only
j

consideration in the 'claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry
Rogers .. Jtis not to be considered for claims in.the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry
Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the Third Party Defendant Treasµry Valley Area of Narcotics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited
purpose, you must not consicler such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for
which it is admitted.

~ven
-Modified
=Not given
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken
before the trial

preserved in writing, and sometimes upon video tape.

evidence is

entme:ct to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you heard, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.

2
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3
The testimony

James Krieger was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the

u•=··,._._,_ against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers.

It is not to be· considered for

claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The testimony of Dr. Karl Olson was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the
Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for
claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
The testimony of Scott Mederios was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the
Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for
claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.

3
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6
You have heard the testimony of Donna Simona concerning a statement made by the
Department of Labor before this trial. The believability of a witness may be challenged by
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not consistent with
the witness' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be considered by you only for the
purpose of deciding whether you believe Ms. Simona's testimony and the weight to be given the
testimony that you heard from the witness in this courtroom. This evidence of a statement by the
Department of Labor has been admitted to help you decide if you believe Ms. Simona's
testimony. You cannot use this statement as evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
The testimony of Dr. Ronald Kristensen and Plaintiff's Exhibits 61 through 69 were
admitted only for consideration in the claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House
and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner
House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of
Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it is admitted.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
These instructions explain your
It is

as jurors and define

law that applies to this case.

duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts,
to

case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective

assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.

It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or
explain the point further.

In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts.

While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you

understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence.

My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my

responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.

/G.1ven
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Toe law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what

weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and
background of ytmtlives. There is no magical formula for evaluating tesfuncmy. ,In your everyday
affairs, you determine. for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight
you attach to what you are told.

The considerations you use in making the more important

decisions in your everyday dealings are the· same considerations you should apply in your
deliberations in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
·,

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
Toe law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

INSTRUCTION NO. 10
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.

6

~iven
-Modified
=Not given

54

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. The original
instructions and the exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not
alter them or write or mark on them in any way.

If you have any questions about the handling

or use of the exhibits, submit those questions in writing to me through the bailiff.
You will each receive a copy of the instructions. The copies will be presented to you in
booklet form. Please do not write or mark any of the copies.
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There
may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern
yourselves about such gap.

7
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
following facts are not in dispute: .
1. Turner
House located at 105 North Second Street in Mountain Home, Idaho is
.
~

owned by Defendant Larry Rogers who purchased the building in 2006.
2. There is no elevator within Turner House; the :floors are connected by a series of
stairways.
3. Cheryl Barker is Mr. Rogers' sister. At all times.relevant she has been the general
manager of Turner House for her brother.
4. Prior to January 7, 2013, Ms. Barker entered into a lease agreement with Narcotics
Anonymous for use of the third :floor meeting room.
5. Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf of Narcotics Anonymous.
6. There was no electricity to a light fixture at the second :floor landing.
7. Ms. Barker and Mr. Rogers knew that the public was using the stairs to attend
Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third :floor of Turner House.
8. Plaintiff Donna Simono attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third floor
of Turner House pursuant to a court order.
9. Ms. Simona's medical treatment and associated costs of $47,215.00 were
reasonable and necessary to treat her injuries and a summary of those medical costs
and bills were admitted into evidence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
is more probably true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure· to use
ordinary care in the management of one's IJ!operty or person. The words "ordinary care"
mean the ca.re a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does
not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for
you to decide.

INSTRUCTION NO. 15
It was the duty of all persons, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care
for the safety of themselves and each other.

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
The owner and/or tenant owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing persons on
the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
The owner owes a duty to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition known to the
owner.

10

/Given
-Modified
-Not given

558

INSTRUCTION NO. 18
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected

business there conducted, or whose visit may reasonably be said to co:n:fer or anticipate a
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the owner and/or tenant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 19
An owner and/or tenant owes a duty of ordinary care under all the circumstances towards

invitees who come upon the premises. This duty extends to all portions of the premises to which an
invitee may reasonably be expected to go.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20
licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in
purpose, with the consent of the owner and/or tenant. The consent of the owner and/or tenant may
be implied from the circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises.

INSTRUCTION NO. 22
The owner and/or tenant owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing
hazards on the land that were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably
discoverable by the licensee.

/G.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 23
A tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third partt~s are concem~d, to
the owner, and

case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the

premises, the general rule is that the tenant may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.

13
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24
The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. That Defendant Larry Rogers and/or 'Turner House was negligent;
That Plaintiffwasinjured;
3. The negligence of the Defendants Turner House and/or Larry Rogers was the
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff; and
4. The elements of damage and amount thereof·
You will be. asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

Question No. 2: Was there a breach of duty on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers and
Turner House which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all. the evidence that each of the propositions have
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, ify()µSmd that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer this question ''No."

INSTRUCTION NO. 25
In this case, the Defendants Larry Rogers and Turner House have alleged that the
plaintiff was negligent. On this defense, the Defendant Larry Rogers· and Turner House
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The Plaintiff, Ms. Simono, was negligent.

2. The negligence of the Plaintiff, Ms. Simino, was a proximate cause of her own
injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

Question No. 5: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the
burden of proof required and you should answer this question ''No."

14
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INSTRUCTION NO. 26
The Third Party Plaintiffs haAe burdtjn of proof on each of the following propositions:
That the Third Party Defe:ndant, Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous literature was negligent;
2.

That the

Thlrd

Party :Plaintiffs

I..arry

Rogers, CherylBarker, and Turner

House were injured;
3.

The negligence of the Defendants Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics

Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous literature was the proximate cause· of the

injury to the Third Party Plaintiff; and'
4.

The elements of damage and amount thereof.
!I

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

Question No. 3: Was there a breach of duty on the part of Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley
Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause
of the Plaintiff's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions have
been proved, you should answer this question«Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, J'J~1h~intiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27
this case, the. Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous has alleged that the Third
Party Plaintiff was negligent. On this defense, the Third Party Defendants have the burden of proof
on

of the following propositions:·

1.

The Third Party Plaintiff was negligent.

2.

The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

Question No. 5: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simona, which was the
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find

.

1\,1,-.d~

that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the,.ctefendant has not met the
burden of proof required and you should answer this question ''No."

16
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•
INSTRUCTION NO. 28
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable
""'r"'"''"""' produced

It is sufficient

the loss or the damage complained of. It need not

the only cause.

it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a

proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which
each contributes to the injury.

/.
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INSTRUCfION NO. 29

Third Party Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions on
Party Claim of Breach
1.

Contract:

contract existed between Third Party Plaintiffs Rogers, Barker and Turner House, and

Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous;
2. The Third Party Defendant breached the contract;
3. The Third Party Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Question No. 4: Was there a breach of contract on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure

Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate
cause of the Plaintiff's damages?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these

propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find
1lwd ~Pl~~+::,-

that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the d ~ has not met the
burden of proofrequired and you should answer this question "No."

/
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
The term"agent"

to a per~on authorized by another, called the "principal/ to act for

or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the
agent's scope of authority.

Both agent and principal are liable for acts by the agent, acting within the scope of authority
for the principal, unless the identity of the principal and nature of the agency are known to the
plaintiff at or before the time of the act in question. Where the identity ofthe principal and nature
of the agency were known, only the principal is liable.

/
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INSTRUCTION NO. 31
In deciding this case,
uvu,,ivu

may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any

by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing

straws. If money damages are to be

awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the
sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage
award or percentage of negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 32
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

/
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants Rogers and

House, you must then determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages

· 1. The nature of the injuries;

2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities.
B. Economic damages
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses

incurred as a result of the injury;
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

INSTRUCTION NO. 34
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

21
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35
Under a standard table

mortali% the life expe,ctancyof afemale ag~

is 84 years .. This

figure is not conclusive; It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life
based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be
considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, including
the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities.

/
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INSTRUCTION NO. 36
In this case you
consists of a

be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
,--,

-

-

-

I

,

questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you

now.
Sign the verdict form as instructed in another instruction and advise the Bailiff.

23
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37
retiring to the

room, select one of your number as a foreperson, who will

"'"''"u1,, over your deliberations.

Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use
only the ones conforming to your conclusions •
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your
verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.

your number as a foreperson, who will
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdic

submitted to you with any instructions.

Follow the directions on the verdict form, an answer all of the questions required of you by
the instructions on the verdict form.
/

urths of your number, or nine of you. As soon
as nine or more of you shall have agreed p

each of the required questions in the verdict,

you should fill it out as instructed, and ave it igned. It is not necessary that the same nine
agree on each question. If your verdi t is un

· ous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if

nine or more, but less than the entir jury, agree,

en those so agreeing will sign the verdict.

As soon as you have com eted and signe the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into op

/ Given
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INSTRUCTION NO. 39
If i.t becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

INSTRUCTION NO. 401
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In
a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments. to you and then you will retire to
the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's views.

Deliberate with the

objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

28
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.INSTRUCTION NO. 41
. YOU

have

llOW

completed your° duties as]iiro~s fo this Case and ar~ discharged With

the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now disetiss this case with the attorneys or with
anyone else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you
want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may·choose not to discuss the case with
anyone at alL If you choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much
or as little as you like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If
anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you may report it to me.

Dated: December

\'2-, 2014
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THE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

DONNA SIMONO,
Case No. CV-2013-209
Plaintiff,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
M1D DOES I 1tlROUGH X,
Defendants.

TURNER HOUSE, LARRY J. ROGERS,
CHERYL BARKER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
TREASURE VALLEY AREA OF
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS AND
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS
LITERATURE,
Third-Party Defendants.

MODIFIED OR NOT GIVEN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Attached hereto are the instructions discussed at the jury instruction conference which
were NOT GIVEN to the jury in the above-captioned case.
Dated: December .Jl..~4

Lynn G. Norton, District Judge
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Certain evidence was just admitted for a limited purpose
Whenever evidence is admitted

a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any

purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted.
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qualifications and credibility of the vr.tness ru.1:d the reasons given for the opinion. You are not
boand by such opinion. Give it the v,eight, if any, to •.vhlch you deem it entitled.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
These

explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case.

It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts,
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or
explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This

evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence.

My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my

responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
[There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark
be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it
as though you had never heard it.]
23
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•
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
As the sole judges

the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what

weight you attach to it.

so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and

background of

There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday

affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight
you attach to what you are told.

The considerations you use in making the more important

decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your
deliberations in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO_

~fjl~

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The lawy/.akes no distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonaoffethod of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.

. If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the 1Nitness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and

~

cfa£U

·

not shovf them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

Old version
INSTRUCTION NO.

The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. The original
instructions and the exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not

·

alter them or write or mark on them in any way. [Some of the exhibit(s) have been sealed in bags
or containers that allow you to view them.

Do not open or remove the contents of these

exhibits.] If you have any questions about the handling or use of the exhibits, submit those
questions in writing to me through the bailiff.
You will each receive a copy of the instructions. The copies will be presented to you in
booklet form. Please do not write or mark any of the copies. ·
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There
may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern
yourselves about such gap.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
The following facts are not in dispute:
Th~llowing facts are undisputed and to be taken as true:
(2) Turner House located at 105 North Second Street in Mountain Home, Idaho is
owned by Defendant Larry Rogers who purchased the building in 2006.
2. Mr. Rogers has remodeled and currently is remodeling portions of Turner House,
including retail businesses on the first floor, an apartment for Mr. Rogers' use on the
second floor, and a meeting room for Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous

0

on the third floor.
There is no elevator within Turner House; the floors are connected by a series of
stairways.

@ Cheryl Barker is Mr. Rogers' sister. At all times relevant she has been the general
manager of Turner House for her brother.
@Prior to January 7, 2013, Ms. Barker entered into a lease agreement with Narcotics
Anonymous for g;:rc H'1aJ;r use of the third floor meeting room.
~Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf ofNarcotics Anonymous.
7. Mr. Foss facilitate~Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third floor of Turner
House in a semi-re

deled area. He performs some maintenance for Turner House

as per an agreeme

·th Ms. Barker.

~@ There;: no electricity to a light fixture at the lundmg ~ ~ e c o n d )
floor ~ tt!Bter l:IoYH iB 3Q+3.

9. Ms. 138.fltef !!lii4 Mr. Rogers knew th~ld light fixture above the second floor
landing on the stairway of Turner Hou
Rogers' purchase of the building, co

in existence prior to the time of Mr.
t be turned on due to no electrical

connection to it.
@is. Barker and Mr. Rogers knew that the public was using the stairs to attend
Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third floor of Turner House.
-~ven
~od1f1ed

_Not given

30

@0n JBRl:ltlfY 7, 2Gl~, Plaintiff Donna Simono attended, enti

d nd Narcotics

Anonymous meeti'4n the thlrd fl or ofTurner House. pv-<su,,n,I- -it, co,,.\- c,YCIQ r",

Ol'r'd&RlWli/i 1', iUi"

When Ms. Simono left e me

'1, 'Zo 13
g, s e walked down the stairs from the third floor.

from the top third floor down to the second floor

While descending the s ·

landing she fell toward the ottom of the stairs onto the landing below.
esult of the fall. She sustained fractures to her right
ankle that required o

opedic urgery in Boise, Idaho, and sprains to her left ankle.
o.C $ 47, 21'5
s. Simono's medical treatment and associated costs,..were reasonable and necessary
treat her injuries and a summary of those medical costs and bills ~ e admitted

to evidence ..

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

The Defendant Rogers i e that the lighting conditions on the stairs were adequate and
there had never been any compl
Anonymous started holding me in

s to him about inadequate lighting since Narcotics
there in early 2010.

The Defendant Rogers a¥ts that he was not negligent, but rather, it was the negligence
of Ms. Simono that was the prmpd\ate cause of her fall and injuries .

.. .Given
_VModified
_Not given

31

•
evidence on presumed facts
facts undisputed
-- GIVE 1.30.1 (Binding instruction)
Instruction 1.30.l
The following facts are undisputed and are to be taken as true: [insert facts established by
presumption.]
Comment:
Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence treats presumptions as shifting only the burden
of producing evidence on the issue to the party opposing a presumption, unless a statute
expressly provides for a different effect. Neither this instruction nor Instruction 125B purports to
cover instances in which a statute is controlled.
Where a presumption governed by IRE 301 is involved, the court should instruct as
follows:
1. Instruction 1.30.1 should be given when the basic facts which give rise to a
presumption have been proved beyond reasonable dispute and no substantial evidence has been
offered to disprove the fact established by the presumption, or when the fact to be proved by a
presumption has otherwise been proved beyond reasonable dispute.
Instruction 1.30.1 should be used when no substantial evidence has been introduced by
either party concerning the existence of the presumed fact.
3. Where substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact has been
presented by the party opposing the presumption, the presumption has been rebutted and
disappears, the jury will decide the issue based on the evidence, and no instruction should be
given.
4. Where insufficient evidence has been presented to permit the jury to fmd that the basic
facts have been proved, the presumption does not arise.

32

_Given
_Modified
_7Notgiven

586

INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your attention to
when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was admitted for a
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it was admitted.

-

INSTRUCTION NO.
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the

bi'c€-

proposition is more probably true than not true.

I· z.o,~Given

33

_Modified

VJ.1 1.4Not given
1

587

IDJI 220 Definition of negligence; Unmodified; Requested by Plaintiff anci Third P
Oe

M.

·
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care"
mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. ffie law does

(

~

.

That is for

INSTRUCTION NO.
The words ''willful and wanton" when used in these instructions and when applied to the
allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or
reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the
actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of
probability that such harm would actually result.
Comment:
There appears to be no distinction between "reckless" and "willful and wanton" or
"willful or wanton." Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475,479, 333 P.2d 459 (1958); Johnson
v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 873, P.2d 268 (1984); DeGroffv. Wight,
130 Idaho 557, 944 P.2d 712 (1997).

Given
-1.· 'U)Modified
t :'1.,.5Not given

34

~

INSTRUCTION NO.

pe'ISc:)nS

It was the duty

all parties persons, ind~eg; tke Eain.tiff ~4~. ~imoao 5 De:fuudaot RQget:51,

and 'Thtfd Pflfty Defendant ~~meotics ktonmmas, before and at the time of the occurre~ce, to use

(.,AstrA'·

~

ordinary care for the safety of themselves and each other, [and fur their ovm and each other's
property].

INSTRUCTION NO.

~&-"'

You are to accept as a fact that _ _ _ _ was exercising ordinary care at the time of and

~

immediately before the accident.
Comment:
Use this instruction where there is no evidence on the issue of due care. If there is
sufficient evidence on the issue, the presumption evaporates and no special instruction should be
given at all. Idaho Rule of Evidence 301; see also, IDJI2d 130 and comment.

INSTRUCTION NO.
{4:Pp":lo-("

The negligence, if any, of the defendant

NPr

__:J.-_....

[any other defendant] [the defendant

name

(name)

].

35

Given

1,. 00•'? Modified

\W .,___Not given
89

INSTRUCTION NO.

\/

fowner] [occupant] owes a duty not to cause intentional or ~kless harm to persons or
property on the premises.

oJd/ov.\e~an~

1NSTRUCI10NNO.

\ ~

~-

ThekwnerJ [QC.CUpi«] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing persons on
premises to an unreasonable risk of harm.

INSTRUCTION NO._ _
The {owner] [occupant] owes a duty to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition
known to the {owner] [occupant], or v,hich, in the t*ercise of ordinary care, should hEP,'e been
discovered.

INSTRUCTION NO. --IIf an [owner's] [occupant's] employee creates a ~/erous or defective condition, or has

knowledge ofit, the [owner] [occupant] is deemed to have kn~edge of it as a matter oflaw.

v-'l}tJ row'f\

Given
7Modified
"; .I)\ ~:!ilNot given
I

36

INSTRUCTION NO.

1Jnd/O'I ~al't
An [ov,'ller],Joccupantf owes a duty of ordinary care under all the circumstances towards
invitees who come upon the premises. This duty extends to all portions of the premises to which an
invitee may reasonably be expected to go.

The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to exercise ord'
for the purpose of discovering dangerous conditions.

care in inspection of the premises
\p~~

INSTRUCTION NO.

An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected

with business there conducted, or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the [owner] [occupant}.
::::>

I0Il3JS-Dµtyto

ali

~:J(o, -ltt1~~

INSTRUCTION NO.

The owner~owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on the land
that were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee.

Comment:
"Reckless" appears to be the equivalent of "viillful and v.ranton," and is more
understandable. See Comment to Instruction 2.25.

37

Given
_7Modified

_Not given

591

•
INSTRUCTION NO.
licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's
purpose, with the consent of the [owner] [occupant] owner or occupant. The consent of the [owner]
[occupant] owner or occupant may be implied from the circumstances under which the visitor
enters the premises.
Comment:
See, Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994).

INSTRUCTION NO.

is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangero
land.

Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012)

INSTRUCTION NO.
Tenants owe a duty of ordinary care under all circumstanc~ward invitees who come

upon the premises.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 P.2d 971 (1994).

38

Given
1.1~.1 Modified
'O"~ "'v Not given

592

INSTRUCTION NO.
a reasonably safe condition for its invitees even though

Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 (1994).

INSTRUCTION NO.
A tenant cannot,

the terms of the lease, be discharged from the duty to its guests or

Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 P.2d 971 (1994).

INSTRUCTION NO.
A tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to
be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the
premises, the general rule is that the tenant may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)

b)\\,lw\ Given

39

_Modified
h:> \J 1-Not given

9

INSTRUCTION NO.
tenant, but not the owner is liable

injuries to

use of the premises so far, at least, as they were under his co tr 1. A tenant having control over the
demised premises is deemed, so far as third parties or the pub
in cases of injuries to third parties, occasioned by the conditi n

are concerned, to be the owner, and
use of the premises, it is a general

rule, prima facie, breach of duty and therefore the liability is that of the tenant and not that of the
owner.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)

INSTRUCTION NO.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)

INSTRUCTION NO.
The owner owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dJ

ous existing hazards on the land

f

that were known to the owner and unknown and not reasonabl~ ·scoverable by the licensee.

Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756 (2009)
40

_Given
Modified

vNotgiven

59

e
o.
On the issue of - - - -, th - - - + - - - - has the burden

proof on each of the

propositions:
ultimate fact or conclusion to be proved, not specific
facts, in concise format. Use numbered

You will be asked the following question n
(Insert the exact jury interrogato

e jury verdict form:

on th issue).

If you find from your consideration
contained in this instruction has bee proved, you should answer the jury question ''yes." If you
find that any of these propositions has not been proved, you should answer the question "no."

INSTRUCTION NO.
The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
lat~ ~,s and{0Yl'uffllt"l-\o11sc..
1. That Defendant was negligent;
2. That Plaintiff was injured;

(.2)~ ~rs

_.. :-n.
-,(J(
'"''\\A.n-..1i

IL, . ...,,

3. The negligence of the Qefendantwas the proximate cause of the injury to tl1e
plaintiff; and
4. The elements of damage and amount thereof
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

1w~

the defendant negligent, and if so, was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of

~am-ages to the plaintiff?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions have
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer this question "No."

Given
vModified
_Not given

41

•
INSTRUCTION NO.
this case, the defendant has alleged that the plaintiff was negligent. On this
defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The plaintiff was negligent.
2. The negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of [his/her] own injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

~

the plaintiff negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate )

~ e of [his/her] injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof
required and you should answer this question "No."

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous have
~ r«J. \'.e(~
3",.P

alleged that the ,laintiff was negligent. On this defense, the \lefendants have the burden of proof on
each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff was negligent.

2.

The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:

~ the plamtiff Donna Simona negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence

>

~oximate cause of her injuries?"

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof
required and you should answer this question "No."

42

Given
VModified
....:_Not given

96

INSTRUCTION NO.
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained 0£ It need not be the only cause.
It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in brin.gfag about an
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which
each contributes to the injury.

NNO.
You must decide from the evidenc if ogers knew, or by the exercise of reasonable
care should have known, of the existence o
constructive notice of a dangerous condition

Rogers must have had either actual
in order to establish a breach of the duty o c

Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 I

o 77 , 777-78, 251 P.3d 602, 605-06 (2011) .

.\iX?Given
_Modified
bl)\\1,:mNot given
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597

"
INSTRUCTION NO.
person fails to exercise ordinary care for her own safety when she does something
to

something under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee

that by her action or failure to act, she will subject a person or property to an unreasonable
risk of injury or damage. Thus, when a reasonable person knows or should know that a
course of conduct poses substantial, inherent risks, yet the person persists in the conduct
voluntarily and suffers injury as result, the person will not be permitted to recover from
someone who is less negligent.
If you find that Ms. Simono engaged in conduct that contributed to her iPJury, you
must find that Ms. Simono' s conduct was negligent, in some degree.

No citation

_Given
Modified
v'Notgiven
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER
Rogers and Barker have

burden of proving each of the

1. A contract existed between Rogers and Barker and Narcotics Anonymous;
2. Narcotics Anonymous breached the contract;
3. Rogers and Barker have been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions
required of Rogers and Barker has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the
affirmative defenses raised by Narcotics Anonymous. If you find from your consideration of all
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict
should be for Narcotics Anonymous on the breach of contract claim.

~,A~~r-*

INSTRUCTION NO.

The p~has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:

l'n\'d~

-tt,l'O p,l.f

1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant;
$1f'O~~
2. The defel).d,ant breached the contract;
~~Qe"'11
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. Tue amount of the daniages.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required
of the p~tiff has been proved, then you must consider the iss~f the affirmative defenses raised
by th~efen~ and explained in the next instruction. If yo/~ from your consideration of all

the evidence th~t :piy of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict should
»,.'(Ii~ .

be for the defendant.

Given
bl)t\wV\Modified
\\)?-Not given
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•
INSTRUCTION NUMBER
contract is an agreement between two or more parties to

or not do something that is

supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four
elements. The four elements are:
I. Competent parties;
2. A lawful purpose;
3. Valid consideration; and
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms.

It is not disputed that the above elements are present in the contract alleged in this case.

_Given
-~odified
.LNotg,ven

46

"
Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is properly a
issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should the court determine
is properly before the jury, the following instruction may be appropriate:

INSTRUCTION NO.
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following provisions:
1.

Tenant may make no alteration to premises without owner's permission .

2.

Tenant will replace all inoperative lightbulbs or tubes, as needed.

3.

Tenant agrees to maintain premises in neat and clean condition.

Maintain all

furnishings in good condition, aliowing for reasonable wear.
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following:
1.

The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances giving

rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it.
2.

Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence

that a special meaning was intended.
3.

Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing

what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided that
such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the
remainder of the terms.
The eontract should be eonstrued to avoid any contradiction or abSllfditie&
[Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any
generally knovm and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the evidence
that this 1,vas not intended].

_Given
Modified
.ird'lot given
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INSTRUCTION NO.
may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement,
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such
testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language.

VJ )\,h..ct~ ·

INSTRUCTION NUMBER
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So
long as all the required elements are present, it makes no different whether the agreement is in

w l~ vcJ.)l '()

writing.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER
An oral agreement that contains all of the elements of a contract is a binding contract.

\u)~~{l
48

_Given
Modified

~otgiven

02

INSTRUCTION NUMBER
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach
that defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract.

I Ervin Const. v.

Van Onle,'i, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993)

INSTRUCTION NO.
When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, the law implies that it is to
be performed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. If you find a contract
exists in this case, you are to determine what a reasonable time would be for the performance of this
contract under these circumstances.
Comment:
See Cur:?on v. Wells Cargo, Jnc., 86 Idaho 38,382 P.2d 906; Irvine v. Perry, 78 Idaho 132,299
P.2ct 97 and LC. § 28-1-204.

_Given
Modified
vi<iot given
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•
INSTRUCTION NO.
case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defe

The defendant has the

burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted.
[Insert the specific affirmative defense elements applicable

the defendant's claims.]

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence th e ch of the propositions required
of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict should be cfi the efense. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the proposik'ons has not been proved, then the
defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of prevention of

defendant's performance of the contract. If this affirmative d fens is proved, the defendant is
excused from performance.
Comment:
Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 742-743n.2 (Ct. App. 1993); Fergerson v. City of
Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 193, (Ct. App. 1998)

_Given
_ l\jlod ified
.JL'.Not given

50

will invariably be based upon a specific fact circumstance.
pattern instruction focuses on the elements of the defense rather than on
attempt to
catalog the circumstances giving rise to it. In the ordinary case, it may be
to include
aa<Jmomil instructions addressing the specific circumstances of the case.
..,...,....,,v,,, Impossibility as a defense

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, the defendant has claimed the defense of impossibility because of the follov.,ing
circumstance:
[Insert description of circumstance, such as death of essential participant, destruction of
essential property, unforeseen change oflaw, act of God, etc.]

In order for this defense to apply, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following:
no fault of the

1.

defendant.
2.

The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably h v

the defendant when the contract was entered into.
3.

The happening of this circumstance was not

responsibility of any party by the contract itself.
4.

· The happening of this circumstance prevents the perform

essential and important terms.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.

51

_Given
-~edified
..!.LNot given
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•
INSTRUCTION NO.
this case that Cheryl Barker was the agent of the principal,
Rogers, at the time of the transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Larry Rogers, the
principal, is responsible for any act of Cheryl Barker, the agent, within the scope of the agent's
authority.

52

_Given
_../Modified
_Not given

61) {i

•
INSTRUCTION NO.
deciding this case,

may not delegate any

your decisions to another or decide any

question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the
sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage
('O

award or percentage of negligence.

ob) l

INSTRUCTION NO.
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

,
.,,()ch\.
,'
J

53

~iven
_Modified
_Not given
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•

INSTRUCTION NO.

~(S;;,nd IV!l'b'

-

~SQ-

the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the ~efendan:Q you must
then determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages
I. The nature of the injuries;
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities.

~·

B. Economic damages
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses
incurred as a result of the iajury ($+.:,2 U);
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

~fd~\

-fr~~

If the jury decides the plcrinti:# is entitled to

cover from e ~ defendant/, the

jury must dete1111llle the amount ofmo ey that will r asonably and fairly corate
for any damages proved to be proximate

tet1~

caused b the negligence of suet' de~t(i).

The elements of damage the jury
A. Non-economic damages

I. The nature of the injuries;
2. The physical and mental pain

suffering, past and future;

3. The impairment of abilities t
B. Economic damages
1.

The reasonable v

Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
_G,iven
~od1f1ed

_Not given

54

INSTRUCTION NUMBER
When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair

ark value" in these fastructions as

services rendered, I mean the amount of money that a wil ·

employer would pay and a willing

r:::! ,1J
~

employee would accept for the services in question, under i umstances as existed immediately
prior to the occurrence in question, in an open marketplace.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and [) ~
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered.

r

INSTRUCTION NUMBl/
Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty.
cannot be left to speculation.

existence and extent of damages

W~d.~

-'-

Anderson v. Nafziger v. GT Newcomb, Inc.,
100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 (1979)

t'Y\ i cldb. ~ n
_Modified
~t~otgiven
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•
INSTRUCTION NO.

it\

Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age 49 i s ~ years.
figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of
life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be
considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, including
the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities.

56

_Gi,ven
_./lv1od1fied
_Not given
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~~

INSTRUCTION NO.

-#~~~

If the jury decides the.plaintiff is entitled to recover from the .defendant, the jury ~ t /
'

~

~

~~~J~

determine the amount of money that will reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of

-H11rtJ f.&(O'lJ
the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from theieefendant' s
breach of contract:

1/

[Insert the elements of damage that have a basis in the evidence

.,,

Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine.

57

_Given
Modified
.....-Not given

Gl l

INSTRUCTION NO._ _
On the issue of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving to prove each of the
following propositions:
1. A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendants to conform to a certain standard of
conduct;
2. A breach of that duty;
3. A causal connection between the conduct of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous and the resulting injuries to plaintiff Ms. Si.mono; and

4. Actual loss or damage.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics
Anonymous, which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions
contained in this instruction has been proved, then you should answer the jury question "yes." If
you find that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer the question
"no."
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER
this case
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

In this case you will return a special verdict, consisting of a series of questions which you
should answer. In answering each question you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence
in the case, that your choice of answers is more probably true than not true.
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as follows:
. 0 0 " .)0 " \ \ ~ , , -z...ol'a ·
We, the Jury, answer the special interro_gatories as follows:
(Siu.a~ l',)c) ..1.: Wha.} ums. .\-k.4 S'\imA,s of Donna '& 1""c:u,
~ {1'2.4t1-',ii;.2L.
P.s ,It) "f'i> f1\f., ""'5" -c ~ uq,,.s '"' ...ike l!CQll5'C.51 y'\,,. '¥7'\
As 1tl NA 1Y1
J
~estion No. 1: Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers which was a
{ proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages?
Answer to Question No.1:

Yes L_J

No L_J

Proceed to Question No. 2.
Question No. 2: Was there negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area
of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause of the
Plaintiff's damages?
Answer to Question No. 2:

Yes L_J

No L_J

If your answers to both Questions No. 1 and 2 are ''No," do not answer any further questions.
Simply sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If your answer to either or both of Questions No. I
and 2 is "Yes," proceed to Question No. 3.
~ .l,k'l'Q. a, '()N!zo. ot K .
Question No. 3: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the
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proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages?

Answer to Question No. 3:

Yes .___.

Proceed to Question No.
Question No. 4: You are now to apportion the fault of the parties in terms of a percentage. Insert
the percentage of negligence of each party, if any, which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's
damages. Your percentages must total 100%.
%
a) Plaintiff Donna Simono
b) Defendant Larry Rogers
%
_
_
_
_
_
%
c) Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous

Proceed to Question No. 5.
Question No. 5: We assess the Plaintiff's damages as follows:

$_ _ _ __

a) Economic Damages
b) Non-Economic Damages

$_ _ _ __

Total Damages:

$_ _ _ __

Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a

:S,, who will

preside over your deliberations.
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use
only the ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your
verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing ·will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.

INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as ~ ' who will
preside over your deliberations.

An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions.
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by
the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict,
you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine
agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.
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If it becomes necessary during yoµr delibe:ratfons to communicate with me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to 'the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, yo1,1. are :not to rev~al to anyone how the jury stands on
--

l

--

,_

•

'

'

'

any of the questions before you, ~umerically or otherwise, unless Iequested to do so by me.

INSTRUCTION NO._ _
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In

(\

0

a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to
the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you. has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the

.

outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's scnsr:: of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to chai."lge that
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's views.

Deliberate with the

objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
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